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A CONTRACT THEORY OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM1 
PHILIP LEE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Academic freedom is central to the core role of professors in a free society. 
Yet, current First Amendment protections exist to protect academic 
institutions, not the academics themselves. For example, in Urofsky v. Gilmore, 
six professors employed by various public colleges and universities in Virginia 
challenged a law restricting state employees from accessing sexually explicit 
material on computers owned or leased by the state.2 The professors claimed, 
in part, that such a restriction was in violation of their First Amendment 
academic freedom rights to conduct scholarly research.3 The Fourth Circuit 
upheld the law and noted that “to the extent the Constitution recognizes any 
right of ‘academic freedom’ above and beyond the First Amendment rights to 
which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres in the University, not in 
individual professors, and is not violated by the terms of the Act.”4 In other 
words, this particular court held that academic freedom protects the institution 
as a whole, but not the individual professors. When other courts have decided 
to protect various scholarly activities through First Amendment principles, 
 
 1. A version of this Article appears in chapters 4–6 of PHILIP LEE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PROFESSIONAL NORMS, AND 
CONTRACTUAL DUTIES (2015), published by Lexington Books. Professor Lee’s book also 
contains expanded discussions on the history of the American Association of University 
Professors, additional professorial freedom categories based on the First Amendment, and a 
related case study. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, David A. Clarke School of Law, University of the District of 
Columbia; B.A., Duke University, 1996; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2000; Ed.M., Harvard 
Graduate School of Education, 2012; Ed.D., Harvard Graduate School of Education, 2013. I 
dedicate this Article to my mom and dad, who have shown me love and encouragement for all of 
my days. I am grateful to Julie Reuben, Natasha Warikoo, Bob O’Neil, Marc Johnson, Michael 
Horne, Adrienne Mundy-Shephard, and Eddie Contreras for their helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of this Article, and to Joe Singer, Todd Rakoff, Bob Iuliano, Henry Rosovsky, and Larry 
Bacow for stimulating discussion regarding academic freedom. 
 2. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 404 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 3. Id. at 405. 
 4. Id. at 410 (emphasis added). Note that Chief Judge Harvie J. Wilkinson’s concurring 
opinion in this case disagrees with the reasoning of the majority opinion and warns about the 
dangers to academic freedom that it poses. See id. at 426–35 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 
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their analysis has generally been rooted in public employee free speech 
analysis, and has not taken into account the unique context of American higher 
education. 
In this Article, I argue that the dominant constitutional analysis of 
academic freedom is insufficient to protect the full range of academic freedom 
interests that have emerged over time. Specifically, constitutionally based 
academic freedom is unduly limited by: (1) the state action doctrine; (2) the 
constraints of public employee free speech principles; and (3) the judicial 
interpretations that grant this freedom to universities only, leaving professors 
without this protection when their interests collide with their universities. 
Thus, constitutionally based academic freedom is inadequate to preserve the 
free exchange of ideas that universities are supposed to epitomize. 
As an alternative to an exclusively First Amendment foundation for this 
freedom, I argue for a contract law-based conception specifically for 
professors. Contract law allows courts to protect the rights of professors at both 
public and private universities. It also allows for the recognition of 
professional norms and academic custom in interpreting the rights and duties 
of professors and their universities. Finally, contract law also allows courts to 
structure remedies that take into account the specific campus contexts that give 
rise to various disputes. Therefore, in order to create more consistency in the 
law and an alignment between institutional and professorial protections at both 
public and private universities, I argue that while constitutional law is still the 
proper mechanism for defending institutional rights from government 
interference, contract law should be the primary mechanism for protecting 
professorial academic freedom. While professors at state institutions would 
have additional First Amendment protections against their employers, for 
reasons I detail in this Article, I contend that these protections are insufficient. 
Thus, developing a rich body of contract law on this subject would greatly 
enhance professorial academic freedom across the country. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the evolution of 
judicial conceptions of academic freedom. Part II then analyzes the limitations 
of constitutionally based academic freedom to protect professors engaging in 
their scholarly work. Given these constraints, Part III concludes with an 
exploration of contract law as a better foundation for professorial academic 
freedom. 
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PART I:  ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE COURTS 
A. Constitutionally Based Academic Freedom 
1. Institutional Academic Freedom: Alignment of Professorial and 
University Interests Against State Action. 
Starting in the 1950s, courts started to grapple with defining academic 
freedom—using the concept to protect universities from the excesses of 
government authority during the McCarthy period.5 The McCarthy era was a 
time of anti-Communist hysteria that used congressional hearings and other 
mechanisms to purge people thought to have Communist affiliation from 
American life.6 If the government required proof of loyalty from professors, 
universities generally became complicit in ferreting out those deemed 
“disloyal” by association, not by action. Christopher J. Lucas writes: 
The sad history of what happened in higher education between 1940 and the 
mid-fifties when McCarthyism held sway offers yet another cautionary tale 
about the fragility of academic freedom in American life. Although it is true 
there were many instances where there was resistance, in the main, when 
academe was pressured to cleanse itself of suspected dissidents, colleges and 
universities readily accepted.7 
At least 100 tenured or continuing professors were dismissed by universities 
around the country for suspected Communist affiliations or refusal to testify 
against friends, colleagues, and neighbors with such suspected ties.8 
The constitutional foundation for academic freedom arose from a number 
of cases that originated as challenges to unfettered government intrusion in 
relation to public universities during the McCarthy era. Even though faculty 
members sued to vindicate their individual rights in each of these cases, the 
interests of their universities were aligned with theirs—therefore, the courts did 
not create a distinction between the professors’ and the institutions’ rights. 
Academic freedom was presumed to lie with the state institution—and to 
include the protection of the collective faculty. This situation, where 
professorial and institutional interests align, was typical in the early academic 
freedom court cases of the 1950s. 
 
 5. See ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, NO IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES 
3–4 (1986). 
 6. See RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE 3 
(1990); VICTOR S. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES 13 (3d ed. 2002); ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE 
OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 1 (2d ed. 2002). 
 7. CHRISTOPHER J. LUCAS, AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A HISTORY 330 (2d ed. 
2006). 
 8. See ROBERT O’NEIL, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE WIRED WORLD: POLITICAL 
EXTREMISM, CORPORATE POWER, AND THE UNIVERSITY 23 (2008). 
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These McCarthy-era cases defined a public university’s right, based 
primarily on First Amendment principles, to be free from state interference in 
making educational decisions.9 The First Amendment provides, in pertinent 
part, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”10 
Although the text of this amendment makes no mention of academic freedom, 
a number of courts have held that academic freedom implicates First 
Amendment rights. 
As early as 1952, in Wieman v. Updegraff, the U.S. Supreme Court 
invalidated a law that barred people who were members of “subversive 
organizations” from public employment.11 Faculty members at a state college 
challenged the law on due process grounds.12 In Justice Felix Frankfurter’s 
concurring opinion, which would serve as precursor to his subsequent views on 
academic freedom, he discussed both First and Fourteenth Amendment 
concerns and stressed the public importance of free-thinking scholars.13 He 
wrote: 
To regard teachers—in our entire educational system, from the primary grades 
to the university—as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to indulge in 
hyperbole. It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of open-
mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens, 
who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective public opinion. . . . 
They must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into 
the meaning of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history of social 
and economic dogma.14 
Four years later, in Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York 
City, a professor at Brooklyn College challenged his dismissal, which was 
based on a state law that required public colleges in New York to dismiss any 
employee who exercised his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination when testifying before investigatory committees.15 The Court 
struck down the law on due process grounds.16 
In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the seminal academic freedom 
case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire.17 The Court held that a state investigation 
of a visiting guest lecturer at the University of New Hampshire, who was 
allegedly a “subversive person” for the content of his classroom speech and his 
 
 9. Note that some of the earlier cases relied on due process grounds to invalidate certain 
state laws. The focus would soon shift to First Amendment principles. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 11. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). 
 12. Id. at 185. 
 13. Id. at 195–96 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 14. Id. at 196. 
 15. Slochower v. Bd. Of Higher Educ. of N.Y.C., 350 U.S. 551, 552 (1956). 
 16. Id. at 559. 
 17. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
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extramural political associations, was a violation of his due process and free 
association rights.18 The Court observed, “We believe that there 
unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner’s liberties in the areas of 
academic freedom and political expression—areas in which government 
should be extremely reticent to tread.”19 The Court elaborated: 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is 
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy 
that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait 
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would 
imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly 
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is 
that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as 
absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and 
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study 
and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our 
civilization will stagnate and die.20 
Justice Felix Frankfurter, in oft-cited concurring language in Sweezy, defined 
the four essential freedoms of a university “to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who 
may be admitted to study.”21 Justice Frankfurter’s four essential freedoms 
would become a crucial element to later constitutional cases that would grapple 
with the meaning of academic freedom. 
Sweezy was followed by a succession of cases that substantially weakened 
the government’s grip over public schools (K–12) and colleges and 
universities. In Shelton v. Tucker, the Court struck down an Arkansas statute 
that required all teachers in public schools or colleges to annually disclose 
organizational memberships.22 The Court observed, “The vigilant protection of 
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of 
American schools.”23 In 1964, the Court decided Baggett v. Bullitt.24 In 
Baggett, professors, staff members, and students from the University of 
Washington challenged a loyalty oath on constitutional grounds.25 The Court 
held that the oath requirement was unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, a 
violation of basic First Amendment principles.26 
 
 18. Id. at 246–47. 
 19. Id. at 250. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 22. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480 (1960). 
 23. Id. at 487. 
 24. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 360 (1964). 
 25. Id. at 361. 
 26. Id. at 366. Interestingly, the Court recognized the academic freedom of students—albeit 
it did so indirectly in addressing the standing of the students to sue. The Court observed: 
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Three years later, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of 
New York, the concept of academic freedom was explicitly connected to the 
First Amendment.27 Keyishian involved a challenge to a loyalty oath for state 
employees brought by four State University of New York professors and a 
university librarian who also served as a part-time lecturer in English.28 The 
Court struck down the oath requirement (i.e., the Feinberg Law) as a violation 
of the First Amendment.29 The Court noted: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is 
of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. 
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which 
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.30 
The Court also observed, “The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of 
ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide 
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a 
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.’”31 
In the same term as Keyishian, the Court decided Whitehill v. Elkins. In 
Whitehill, a potential hire who was offered a teaching position at the University 
 
Since the ground we find dispositive immediately affects the professors and other state 
employees required to take the oath, and the interests of the students at the University in 
academic freedom are fully protected by a judgment in favor of the teaching personnel, 
we have no occasion to pass on the standing of the students to bring this suit. 
Id. at 366 n.5. 
 27. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967). 
 28. Id. at 592. 
 29. Id. at 609. This case overturned the Supreme Court’s decision in Adler v. Board of 
Education (upholding the Feinberg Law). Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 509 (1952). Note 
that Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in Adler, was the first to mention “academic 
freedom” in a judicial opinion. Id. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He wrote: 
The mere fact of membership in the organization raises a prima facie case of her own 
guilt. She may, it is said, show her innocence. But innocence in this case turns on 
knowledge; and when the witch hunt is on, one who must rely on ignorance leans on a 
feeble reed. The very threat of such a procedure is certain to raise havoc with academic 
freedom. 
Id. He further explained: 
What happens under this law is typical of what happens in a police state. . . . A pall is 
cast over the classrooms. There can be no real academic freedom in that environment. 
Where suspicion fills the air and holds scholars in line for fear of their jobs, there can 
be no exercise of the free intellect. . . . This system of spying and surveillance with its 
accompanying reports and trials cannot go hand in hand with academic freedom. It 
produces standardized thought, not the pursuit of truth. Yet it was the pursuit of truth 
which the First Amendment was designed to protect. 
Id. at 510–11. 
 30. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. 
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of Maryland challenged the constitutionality of a state-mandated loyalty oath 
that was a prerequisite for his employment.32 The loyalty oath required the 
professor to certify that he was “not engaged in one way or another in the 
attempt to overthrow the Government of the United States, or the State of 
Maryland, or any political subdivision of either of them, by force or 
violence.”33 The Court, in a unanimous opinion, struck down the oath 
requirement.34 Relying on the principles set forth in Sweezy, the Court 
observed, “We are in the First Amendment field. The continuing surveillance 
which this type of law places on teachers is hostile to academic freedom.”35 
Starting in the 1970s, courts began to rely on the language contained in 
McCarthy-era academic freedom cases—especially Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurrence in Sweezy—to define academic freedom as a special deference to 
universities in their educational decisions that insulated them from state 
interference, including interference from courts.36 In these cases, like the 
earlier ones from the 1950s and 60s, the interests of the institutions and their 
professors were aligned; therefore, no distinction between institutional and 
professorial freedoms was discussed. For example, in Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke, the Court upheld race-conscious admissions at UC-
Davis Medical School.37 In Bakke, a white male applicant, who was denied 
admission after two attempts, challenged the race-conscious admissions policy 
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.38 Under this constitutional 
provision, the government is required to justify its actions based on different 
levels of review depending on the nature of the rights involved or the 
classifications made.39 If the government action infringes upon a fundamental 
right or makes classifications based on a person’s membership in a suspect 
class (e.g., race or ethnicity), then the applicable standard of review for a court 
hearing the challenge is strict scrutiny.40 The Court found that the relevant 
standard for Bakke was strict scrutiny since the policy in question was based on 
 
 32. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 55 (1967). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 62. 
 35. Id. at 59–60. 
 36. For a fascinating account of the historic rationale for judicial deference to academic 
decisions see Robert M. O’Neil, Judicial Deference to Academic Decisions: An Outmoded 
Concept?, 36 J.C. & U.L. 729, 729–47 (2010). 
 37. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269–71 (1978). 
 38. Id. at 276–78. 
 39. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: 
“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 40. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (“Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect 
and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.”). 
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racial classifications.41 When strict scrutiny is applied, the government must 
show that its action is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.42 
Justice Powell, writing the plurality opinion, found that educational diversity 
was a compelling government interest under strict scrutiny review.43 The 
Court, citing Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Sweezy, reasoned that 
academic freedom for a university includes the discretion to select its own 
student body on educational grounds.44 This constitutionally permissible use of 
race, based on the discretion afforded universities under academic freedom to 
choose whom to admit, was affirmed by the Supreme Court in both Grutter v. 
Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger.45 These companion cases involved challenges 
to the race-conscious admissions policies at the University of Michigan Law 
School and undergraduate program, respectively. In affirming the University of 
Michigan Law School’s policy in Grutter, the Court observed: 
We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public education 
and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the 
university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our 
constitutional tradition. . . . Our conclusion that the Law School has a 
compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view that 
attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper 
institutional mission, and that “good faith” on the part of a university is 
“presumed” absent “a showing to the contrary.”46 
In the most recent challenge to race-conscious admissions, Fisher v. 
University of Texas, the Court deferred to the university’s educational 
 
 41. Id. at 299. The other two levels of scrutiny are intermediate scrutiny and rational basis 
review. If the government action makes classifications based on a person’s membership in a 
quasi-suspect class (e.g., gender), then the court hearing the challenge will apply intermediate 
scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that intermediate scrutiny 
applies to classifications by gender). Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must 
demonstrate that its actions were substantially related to an important government objective. Id. 
(“[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). Finally, for all other categories of state 
action (e.g., economic regulations), the court hearing the challenge will apply rational basis 
review—in which the government must show that its actions were rationally related to a 
legitimate state objective. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) 
(holding rational basis review applies to economic regulations). Strict scrutiny is the most 
difficult standard of review for a law to survive. Rational basis review, on the other hand, is the 
least stringent. Intermediate scrutiny falls somewhere in between the two. 
 42. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (“When [the classifications] touch upon an individual’s race or 
ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on 
that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”). 
 43. Id. at 312–14. 
 44. Id. at 312. 
 45. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271–75 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
343–44 (2003). 
 46. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. 
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judgment as to the compelling interest that diversity serves, but remanded the 
case for the lower court to properly apply the narrow tailoring analysis to the 
means chosen to further that interest.47 From Bakke to Fisher, therefore, the 
Court has shown deference to the university’s educational judgments. 
In the context of academic dismissals, the Court has also given deference 
to universities. In Board of Curators v. Horowitz, a medical student at the 
University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School brought a due process 
challenge to her dismissal during her final year of study for failure to meet 
academic standards.48 The Court, in ruling that due process was satisfied, 
differentiated the heightened process required for disciplinary dismissals to the 
facts at hand in the following way: 
The decision to dismiss respondent, by comparison, rested on the academic 
judgment of school officials that she did not have the necessary clinical ability 
to perform adequately as a medical doctor and was making insufficient 
progress toward that goal. Such a judgment is by its nature more subjective and 
evaluative than the typical factual questions presented in the average 
disciplinary decision. Like the decision of an individual professor as to the 
proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a 
student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative 
information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or 
administrative decisionmaking.49 
In other words, academic dismissals required academic judgments that are best 
made by school officials. Further, in Regents of the University of Michigan v. 
Ewing, the Court upheld a medical school’s decision to dismiss a student on 
academic grounds.50 The medical school refused to allow the student to re-take 
an exam after that student failed with the lowest score in the history of the 
program.51 In recognizing academic freedom at the institutional level, the 
Court deferred to the educational judgment of the medical school to determine 
whether a student should be dismissed based on academic grounds.52 In a 
footnote, the Court also acknowledged the potential conflict between 
institutional and professorial freedoms, noting: “Academic freedom thrives not 
only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and 
students . . . but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous 
decisionmaking by the academy itself . . . .”53 This tension will be highlighted 
in cases where professorial and institutional interests diverge. 
 
 47. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013). 
 48. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 79 (1978). 
 49. Id. at 89–90. 
 50. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 215 (1985). 
 51. Id. at 216. 
 52. Id. at 225. 
 53. Id. at 226 n.12 (citations omitted). 
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In cases where students have claimed free speech rights in the face of 
educational judgments made by universities, institutional academic freedom 
has fared well.54 In a case decided by the Ninth Circuit, Brown v. Li, a student 
at the University of California at Santa Barbara challenged the university’s 
refusal, based on its curriculum requirements, to allow the student to include a 
“disacknowledgements” section in his master’s thesis as a violation of his free 
speech rights.55 This section began, “I would like to offer special Fuck You’s to 
the following degenerates for of [sic] being an ever-present hindrance in my 
graduate career. . . .” and identified a number of university affiliates and others 
that supposedly hindered his progress toward his degree.56 The court found for 
the university, noting that the “decision was reasonably related to a legitimate 
pedagogical objective: teaching [the plaintiff] the proper format for a scientific 
paper.”57 Similarly, in a case before a federal district court, Yacovelli v. 
Moeser, a number of University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) 
students brought a Free Exercise Clause claim against the university to prevent 
it from assigning a book with a positive portrayal of Islam.58 The reading 
assignment was part of an orientation program for all freshmen. UNC allowed 
any student who objected to the reading to opt out of the assignment.59 The 
district court, giving deference to the university’s educational judgment, 
dismissed the students’ claim.60 The court noted, “UNC, instead of endorsing a 
particular religious viewpoint, merely undertook to engage students in a 
scholarly debate . . . about the Islamic religion. Students were free to share 
their opinions on the topic whether their opinions be positive, negative or 
neutral.”61 
Institutional academic freedom, however, is not absolute. Universities are 
given discretion to make their educational decisions unless these decisions are 
constitutionally or otherwise legally prohibited. For example, in Bakke, 
although the educational benefits of diversity were deemed compelling for 
equal protection purposes, the two-tiered admissions process—one for regular 
applicants and a separate one for racial minorities that were considered 
“disadvantaged”—was struck down for not being narrowly tailored.62 The 
same result occurred as with the University of Michigan’s undergraduate 
admissions policy in Gratz, which assigned a specific weight to 
 
 54. Students’ free speech rights are beyond the scope of this Article so they will not be 
addressed in detail here. 
 55. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 56. Id. at 943. 
 57. Id. at 952. 
 58. Yacovelli v. Moeser, 324 F. Supp. 2d 760, 762 (M.D.N.C. 2004). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 763–65. 
 61. Id. at 764. 
 62. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272–73, 320 (1978). 
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underrepresented minority status that proved determinative in the admissions 
decision.63 The only race-conscious admissions policy that has survived strict 
scrutiny review by the U.S. Supreme Court was the University of Michigan 
Law School’s in Grutter, which employed flexible, individualized, holistic 
review.64 So, although the Court will grant some deference to universities 
based on institutional academic freedom, it will still scrutinize these decisions 
to ensure compliance with constitutional principles. This scrutiny can also be 
seen in antidiscrimination law. 
In Powell v. Syracuse University, a visiting architecture professor 
challenged her termination as a product of racial and sexual bias.65 Even 
though the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of her claims, 
the court nonetheless recognized that the academic freedom of a university 
does not embrace “the freedom to discriminate.”66 Similarly, in University of 
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, the university challenged the EEOC’s refusal to 
exclude relevant peer review materials in a discrimination case brought by a 
Chinese-American female professor who was denied tenure.67 The university 
claimed a special academic freedom privilege protecting disclosure of peer 
review materials based on principles of institutional academic freedom to 
determine “who may teach.”68 The Court summarized the university’s 
argument as follows: 
[I]t argues that the First Amendment is infringed by disclosure of peer review 
materials because disclosure undermines the confidentiality which is central to 
the peer review process, and this in turn is central to the tenure process, which 
in turn is the means by which [the university] seeks to exercise its asserted 
academic-freedom right of choosing who will teach.69 
The Court then observed, “To verbalize the claim is to recognize how distant 
the burden is from the asserted right.”70 The Court ruled for the professor 
holding that the she had an unqualified right to acquire the peer review 
materials to determine whether illegal discrimination took place.71 This case 
serves as a reminder that universities’ claims to academic freedom will not 
immunize them from the strictures of Title VII and other federal laws. 
Some courts have acknowledged that universities provide a special context 
in matters involving free expression relating to conditional grants. In Rust v. 
 
 63. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271–72, 275 (2003). 
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 66. Id. at 1151, 1154. 
 67. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 184–86 (1990). 
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Sullivan, the Court held that the Department of Health and Human Services’ 
regulations limiting the ability of recipients of federal funding to engage in 
abortion-related activities were constitutionally permissible.72 However, the 
Court noted that such restrictions on funding in higher educational contexts 
may engender a different result by noting: 
[W]e have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere of free 
expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the 
Government’s ability to control speech within that sphere by means of 
conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the 
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment.73 
Other cases have presented a narrower view. For example, in Rumsfeld v. 
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (“FAIR”), the Court rejected 
the law schools’ argument that they should have the discretion, under First 
Amendment principles, to exclude military recruiters on their campuses.74 The 
law schools contended that such exclusion was as an expression of their 
opposition to military policies that discriminate against openly LGBT soldiers, 
and they should, therefore, not be penalized by the loss of federal funding 
under the Solomon Amendment.75 The Court rejected the law schools’ free 
speech claim and held for the military, observing that “[n]othing about 
recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any speech by recruiters, and 
nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the law schools may say 
about the military’s policies.”76 This case demonstrates that institutional 
expression can be limited by federal funding regulations. 
In addition to institutional academic freedom, individual professors also 
have protections in their scholarly work based on First Amendment principles. 
I will explore some of these protections in the next part. 
2. Academic Freedom as Free Speech for Professors: Divergence of 
Professorial and University Interests 
A number of cases have recognized that First Amendment protections can 
apply to a public university professor’s right to engage in his or her scholarly 
work at the university and speech outside the classroom. In most of these 
cases, the interests of professors and their universities are at odds; indeed, the 
typical dispute arises when professors are punished for veering away from 
institutional mandates such as sexual harassment policies, grading rules, or 
internet usage restrictions. The professors have then pressed their claims in 
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court, claiming that the state universities have infringed on their constitutional 
rights. In these cases, the dichotomy between institutional and professorial 
rights becomes clear. To illustrate this distinction between institutional and 
professorial freedom, I analyze court cases that support the existence of the 
following five broad categories of professorial freedom: 1) classroom teaching; 
2) faculty speech not related to teaching; 3) curricular decisions; 4) grading; 
and 5) research.77 
a. Faculty Speech Related to Classroom Teaching 
Professor speech at public universities is protected by the same principles 
that protect the free speech of all other public employees. In Pickering v. 
Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court held for the first time that a 
public employee could claim First Amendment protection while speaking as a 
citizen on matters of public concern.78 Prior to Pickering, the dominant legal 
view was that public employees relinquished constitutional rights by agreeing 
to work for the government. For example, in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New 
Bedford, a police officer was fired for violating a rule against political 
canvassing.79 The police officer challenged the termination in court, but the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the officer waived his 
constitutional rights by signing his employment contract observing: 
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in 
which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free 
speech . . . by the implied terms of his contract.80 
This view would be dominant until Pickering was decided in 1968. 
Pickering involved a high school teacher who challenged his termination 
for publishing critical comments about the school leadership.81 Specifically, 
the teacher wrote a letter to a newspaper that criticized the Board of 
Education’s allocation of school funds between educational and athletic 
programs and the Board’s and the superintendent’s methods of preventing the 
school district’s taxpayers from knowing the real reasons why additional 
revenues were being requested for the schools.82 The Court, in ruling for the 
 
 77. In a book that I am currently writing, under a publication agreement with Lexington 
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 78. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1968). 
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teacher, articulated the following balancing test: “The problem in any case is to 
arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees.”83 
Free speech protection for public employees was, therefore, not absolute. 
The Court must first make a determination under Pickering that the public 
employee was speaking as a citizen on “matters of public concern.”84 After this 
threshold issue is determined, a balancing test would then be employed to 
determine if the speech would be protected under the First Amendment. The 
contours of the Pickering test were subsequently defined by a number of 
Supreme Court cases, including Mount Healthy School District Board of 
Education v. Doyle and Connick v. Myers.85 Subsequent court decisions have 
relied on the Pickering test in a variety of public employment contexts, 
including those brought by college and university professors who are 
attempting to protect their classroom speech. 
While determining if professor speech used in classroom teaching is 
protected under the Pickering test, many courts have looked to the pedagogical 
relevance of the disputed speech.86 Specifically, these courts have found that 
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the speech must be germane to the content that the professor is teaching about 
in order to be protected by the First Amendment. For example, in Hardy v. 
Jefferson Community College, an adjunct instructor was dismissed for using 
the words “nigger” and “bitch” in his class regarding the impact of such 
oppressive and disparaging language.87 In applying the “public concern” prong 
of Pickering, the Sixth Circuit noted: 
Because the essence of a teacher’s role is to prepare students for their place in 
society as responsible citizens, classroom instruction will often fall within the 
Supreme Court’s broad conception of “public concern.”. . . Although Hardy’s 
in-class speech does not itself constitute pure public debate, it does relate to 
matters of overwhelming public concern—race, gender, and power conflicts in 
our society.88 
In applying the Pickering balancing test, the court held, “On balance, 
Hardy’s rights to free speech and academic freedom outweigh the College's 
interest in limiting that speech.”89 In Dube v. State University of New York, an 
assistant professor of Africana Studies claimed that he was denied tenure for 
discussing controversial subjects in the classroom.90 Specifically, the professor 
made comparisons between Nazism in Germany, Apartheid in South Africa, 
and Zionism in Israel in a class titled The Politics of Race.91 The Second 
Circuit remanded the First Amendment claims to trial and rejected qualified 
immunity as a defense.92 In citing to Pickering and other cases, the Second 
Circuit observed that “assuming the defendants retaliated against [the 
professor] based upon the content of his classroom discourse, such conduct 
was, as a matter of law, objectively unreasonable.”93 
Some courts have refused to apply college sexual harassment policies to 
punish professors who had legitimate pedagogical reasons for teaching in a 
provocative way. In Silva v. University of New Hampshire, a tenured professor 
brought an action against the university after he was dismissed for violating the 
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university’s sexual harassment policy.94 The professor, while teaching a course 
on technical writing, engaged the students in a number of sex-themed 
discussions. For example, he compared the relationship between writers and 
their subjects to the sexual relationships between people.95 He also illustrated 
how a good definition combines a general classification with concrete specifics 
by invoking the following analogy, “Belly dancing is like jello on a plate with 
a vibrator under the plate.”96 The professor claimed that he used these sexual 
examples because he was trying to catch the attention of his class and relate 
abstract concepts to everyday experiences.97 A number of female students 
complained about these examples and the professor was eventually dismissed 
after a formal hearing.98 In finding that Silva’s speech touched on matters of 
public concern, the court recognized: 
It is a fundamental tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence that the 
preservation of academic freedom is a matter of public concern. . . . Further, 
the issue of whether speech which is offensive to a particular class of 
individuals should be tolerated in American schools is a matter of public 
concern.99 
The court held in this regard, “The evidence . . . demonstrates that Silva’s 
classroom statements were not statements ‘upon matters only of personal 
interest,’ but rather were made for the legitimate pedagogical, public purpose 
of conveying certain principles related to the subject matter of his course.” 100 
The court then, under what it called the “Connick-Pickering balancing test,” 
held, “Silva’s First Amendment interest in the speech at issue is 
overwhelmingly superior to UNH’s interest in proscribing said speech.”101 
Other courts have recognized situations where professors were not shielded 
by the First Amendment because the classroom speech was not relevant to the 
subject matter. For example, in Bonnell v. Lorenzo, a community college 
professor was dismissed for using offensive language in class unrelated to any 
legitimate teaching purpose.102 He consistently used the words “fuck,” “cunt,” 
“pussy,” “shit,” “damn,” and “ass” and made a number of sexual jokes in his 
English class without any pedagogical purpose.103 In finding that some of the 
speech—namely the professor’s sarcastic apology—touched on matters of 
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public concern and balancing the interests under Pickering, the Sixth Circuit 
held for the student, noting: 
While a professor’s rights to academic freedom and freedom of expression are 
paramount in the academic setting, they are not absolute to the point of 
compromising a student’s right to learn in a hostile-free environment. To hold 
otherwise under these circumstances would send a message that the First 
Amendment may be used as a shield by teachers who choose to use their 
unique and superior position to sexually harass students secure in the 
knowledge that whatever they say or do would be protected.104 
Similarly, in Martin v. Parrish, a college professor challenged his 
termination for his incessant use of profanity in the classroom.105 The professor 
browbeat his students with expletives such as “bullshit,” “hell,” “damn,” “God 
damn,” and “sucks” in response to their alleged poor attitude.106 The professor 
claimed that his speech was protected by the First Amendment.107 The Fifth 
Circuit, in applying Pickering (although citing only to Connick v. Meyers), 
held for the university.108 The Court noted that the professor’s abusive speech 
did not relate to matters of public concern and, therefore, did not even reach 
the balancing test.109 The Court further noted that the students were a “captive” 
audience and they “paid to be taught and not be vilified in indecent terms.”110 
In Piggee v. Carl Sandburg College, a part-time instructor of cosmetology at a 
community college located in Galesburg, Illinois, gave a gay student two 
religious pamphlets on the sinfulness of homosexuality.111 After the student 
complained to administrators, the instructor was terminated.112 The instructor 
then challenged the termination on First Amendment grounds.113 The Seventh 
Circuit, applying Pickering, ruled for the college.114 Assuming that the 
instructor’s proselytizing related to matters of public concern, the court then 
noted that “we see no reason why a college or university cannot direct its 
instructors to keep personal discussions about sexual orientation or religion out 
of a cosmetology class or clinic.”115 
The outcomes of these cases have turned on the pedagogical relevance of 
the speech at issue. When the professors’ classroom speech was not germane to 
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any pedagogical purpose—e.g., the professors just used profanity for its own 
sake or engaged in conduct that antagonized their students—the speech was 
not protected under the Pickering test. 
In 2006, Pickering was substantially narrowed by Garcetti v. Ceballos.116 
Garcetti involved a deputy district attorney who claimed retaliation for a 
memorandum he wrote and circulated to his supervisors criticizing factual 
inaccuracies in an affidavit related to a pending criminal case.117 The Court 
held that this public employee was not protected under Pickering because 
“when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline.”118 Concerned about the implications that the majority opinion 
would have on professor speech at public universities, Justice Souter wrote in 
dissent: 
This ostensible domain beyond the pale of the First Amendment is spacious 
enough to include even the teaching of a public university professor, and I 
have to hope that today’s majority does not mean to imperil First Amendment 
protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose 
teachers necessarily speak and write “pursuant to . . . official duties.”119 
The majority responded in language that has become known as the Garcetti 
reservation: 
There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or 
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not 
fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence. 
We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we 
conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech 
related to scholarship or teaching.120 
Courts that have subsequently applied Garcetti to speech involving classroom 
teaching have generally recognized the reservation. In Kerr v. Hurd, a federal 
district court ruled that a medical professor’s speech—in which he advocated 
vaginal delivery to his students over Caesarean sections and lectured on the use 
of forceps—was protected under the First Amendment.121 A federal district 
court in Ohio noted: 
Recognizing an academic freedom exception to the Garcetti analysis is 
important to protecting First Amendment values. Universities should be the 
active trading floors in the marketplace of ideas. Public universities should be 
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no different from private universities in that respect. At least where, as here, 
the expressed views are well within the range of accepted medical opinion, 
they should certainly receive First Amendment protection, particularly at the 
university level.122 
Similarly, in Sheldon v. Dhillon, a federal district court in California 
recognized that the “official duties” analysis in Garcetti did not apply to a 
biology professor’s teaching-related comments regarding possible scientific 
causes of homosexuality.123 
In sum, courts have analyzed professor classroom speech under the First 
Amendment by using public employee free speech principles. They have 
attempted to distinguish constitutionally protected, pedagogically relevant 
speech from unprotected harassing speech by protecting the former but not the 
latter. Based on recent cases, professors at state universities have the strongest 
level of constitutional protection in speech related to their teaching. 
b. Faculty Speech Not Related to Classroom Teaching 
In the wake of Garcetti, lower courts have struggled to consistently apply 
what academic freedom means in situations where professor speech outside the 
classroom-teaching context and university interests are at odds—particularly in 
situations where professors have criticized their administrations. 
Reflecting on Garcetti, Judith Areen argues that restricting university 
professors to only promoting government-approved messages would interfere 
with the traditional role of public higher education and would, thus, be an 
unconstitutional prohibition against free speech.124 This approach has gained 
limited traction in the courts. Indeed, a number of courts have simply ignored 
the Garcetti majority’s stated reservation and found that university professor 
speech criticizing university management was not protected by the First 
Amendment any more than other public employees’ speech. 
In Renken v. Gregory, a tenured engineering professor at the University of 
Wisconsin at Milwaukee had his pay reduced and his research funding 
terminated after he criticized the university’s use of grant funds.125 He brought 
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a First Amendment challenge in court.126 The Seventh Circuit, relying on 
Garcetti, held that the professor was not protected by the First Amendment 
because he “was speaking as a faculty employee, and not as a private citizen, 
because administering the grant . . . fell within his teaching and service duties 
that he was employed to perform.”127 Similarly, in Gorum v. Sessoms, a 
tenured communications professor at Delaware State University was 
terminated for making critical comments against the administration, for 
advising a student-athlete who violated the university disciplinary code, and 
for rescinding an invitation to the university president to speak at a public 
event.128 The Third Circuit, also relying on Garcetti, held the professor was not 
protected by the First Amendment because he was acting in accordance with 
his official duties, and not as a private citizen.129 
In a recent case, the Fourth Circuit gave proponents of professorial 
academic freedom hope that some judges would be willing to recognize a 
constitutionally based protection for individual professors speaking on matters 
outside of classroom teaching. Adams v. Trustees of the University of North 
Carolina-Wilmington involved a state university professor’s challenge to his 
university’s refusal to promote him to full professor, which he alleged was 
based on his outspoken Christian and conservative beliefs.130 This professor 
publicized his beliefs in various fora outside the university including 
conservative internet news sites and radio and television broadcasts. The 
university argued that Garcetti precluded the professor’s First Amendment 
claims because the professor’s speech was made in relation to his official 
duties as a state employee.131 The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument noting: 
Applying Garcetti to the academic work of a public university faculty member 
under the facts of this case could place beyond the reach of First Amendment 
protection many forms of public speech or service a professor engaged in 
during his employment. That would not appear to be what Garcetti intended, 
nor is it consistent with our long-standing recognition that no individual loses 
his ability to speak as a private citizen by virtue of public employment. In light 
of the above factors, we will not apply Garcetti to the circumstances of this 
case.132 
This holding, thus, recognized an exception to Garcetti for a professor’s 
speech not related to classroom teaching. Similarly, in Demers v. Austin, the 
Ninth Circuit held that a tenured Washington State University professor’s 
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distribution of a pamphlet and submission of an in-progress book, both of 
which were critical of the university, were matters of public concern under 
Pickering.133 The Court made it clear that Garcetti did not apply to these types 
of professorial speech.134 
Other courts have ruled more narrowly, finding faculty criticism of 
university policies outside the realm of protected speech. In Payne v. 
University of Arkansas, Fort Smith, a tenured professor was demoted for 
criticizing a university policy that increased the minimum hours that faculty 
members were expected to be present on campus.135 Relying on Garcetti, the 
court held: 
Plaintiff’s email and subsequent discussion . . . regarding the policy was a 
criticism of a condition of employment, not of public concern. Accordingly, 
the Court finds that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s speech does not relate to 
matters of public concern for the purposes of Pickering and, therefore, is not 
protected speech under the First Amendment.136 
Further, in Hong v. Grant, a tenured engineering professor at the 
University of California at Irvine was denied a merit salary increase because of 
his critical statements to other faculty members regarding the hiring and 
promotion of some of his colleagues and regarding the university’s use of 
lecturers to teach courses.137 In ruling for the university, the federal district 
court noted that the professor’s statements “were made pursuant to his official 
duties as a faculty member and therefore do not deserve First Amendment 
protection.”138 In other words, the professor’s speech, which the court found 
connected to his duties as a professor, was not at all protected by the First 
Amendment. Robert M. O’Neil notes that a bizarre result of this ruling, if 
taken to its logical conclusion, would be that faculty members “would, in 
effect, be able to speak freely only about matters that are remote from their 
academic disciplines and expertise, while being denied such protection when 
speaking or writing within that realm.”139 
Some courts have viewed speech made on a faculty governance committee 
as not protected by the First Amendment. In Isenalumhe v. McDuffie, two 
tenured nursing professors at Medgar Evars College of the City University of 
New York, who were members of various faculty committees, complained 
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about the process of instituting curricular changes and the process of hiring 
new faculty.140 They claimed that the department chairperson subsequently 
retaliated against them for these complaints.141 A New York federal district 
court held that the disputed speech was made pursuant to their official duties as 
faculty committee members and was not speech made by citizens on matters of 
public concern.142 In a similar vein, in Savage v. Gee, the head reference 
librarian at Ohio State University at Mansfield claimed that he was retaliated 
against for suggesting a book to assign to all incoming freshman while he was 
serving on a faculty committee convened for that purpose.143 The book 
contained “a chapter discussing homosexuality as aberrant human behavior.”144 
While recognizing that there may be a possible Garcetti exception to “teaching 
or research,” the Ohio federal trial court held that the librarian’s 
recommendation was neither.145 Instead, the court found, it was made 
“pursuant to [his] official duties” in serving on the committee and was, 
therefore, not protected under the First Amendment.146 These decisions stand 
in stark contrast to the view that faculty speech related to faculty governance—
made pursuant to service on governance committees—should be protected by 
academic freedom. 
In summary, a professor’s speech at state institutions not related to 
classroom teaching is governed by the same legal framework that protects the 
speech of all government employees. Specifically, if the professor is speaking 
as a citizen on matters of public concerns, courts will apply the Pickering 
balancing test to determine if the speech is protected.147 However, if a court 
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views on a current mascot controversy. Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2004). Relying 
on United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995), the Court 
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the university’s interest in suppressing the speech. Id. at 680. 
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determines that a professor is speaking as a public employee, and not as a 
citizen on matters of public concern, then the speech is not protected by the 
First Amendment. Courts have generally held that professorial speech on 
matters of institutional functioning are made as part of official employment 
duties and, thus, not matters of public concern—thereby, stripping professors 
of First Amendment protection for this speech. However, the issue is far from 
settled. 
c. Faculty Curricular Decisions 
Professors have certain rights over the content of the curriculum when their 
students disagree as to what that content should be.148 In Axson-Flynn v. 
Johnson, a student, based on her Mormon beliefs, refused to use particular 
offensive words or to take God’s name in vain during classroom acting 
exercises at the University of Utah’s Actor Training Program.149 The faculty 
members told her to “get over” her language issues and she eventually left the 
program because she believed that she would have been eventually 
dismissed.150 The student challenged the university’s attempt to force her to 
use certain words as a violation of her free speech and free exercise rights 
under the First Amendment.151 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that this was 
“school-sponsored speech,” and as such, the university’s decision to compel 
that speech would be upheld as long as its decision was “reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”152 The court remanded the case to determine 
whether the strict adherence requirement was truly pedagogical or a pretext for 
religious discrimination.153 Similarly, in Head v. Board of Trustees of 
California State University, a student in San Jose State University’s teaching 
credential program challenged the institutionalization of multiculturalism in 
the university’s curriculum as a violation of his First Amendment rights—
given that he vehemently disagreed with the tenets of multiculturalism.154 The 
court held: 
Public university instructors are not required by the First Amendment to 
provide class time for students to voice views that contradict the material being 
taught or to interfere with instruction or the educational mission. Although the 
 
 148. A similar principle applies in the K–12 classroom. See, e.g., Settle v. Dickson Cnty. Sch. 
Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995) (“So long as the teacher limits speech or grades speech in 
the classroom in the name of learning and not as a pretext for punishing the student for her race, 
gender, economic class, religion or political persuasion, the federal courts should not interfere.”). 
 149. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 150. Id. at 1282–83. 
 151. Id. at 1280. 
 152. Id. at 1290. 
 153. Id. at 1293. 
 154. Head v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., No. H029129, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
393, at *7–8 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2007). 
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First Amendment may require an instructor to allow students to express 
opposing views and values to some extent where the instructor invites 
expression of students’ personal opinions and ideas, nothing in the First 
Amendment prevents an instructor from refocusing classroom discussions and 
limiting students’ expression to effectively teach.155 
Both Axon-Flynn and Head cited to Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier156 for the 
“legitimate pedagogical concerns” standard.157 Hazelwood was another K–12 
case, but it set forth the relevant legal standard in future cases that involved 
classroom speech at public universities. This case involved a high school 
student’s First Amendment challenge to the removal of two articles in the 
school’s newspaper.158 One of the articles dealt with students’ experiences with 
pregnancy and the other reported on the impact of divorce on students at the 
school.159 Pursuant to the school’s pre-approval procedure, the principal 
decided to remove the articles based on concerns about appropriateness and 
confidentiality.160 The Court, in finding for the school, held “that educators do 
not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style 
and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long 
as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”161 
When the interests of a professor collide with the interests of a university, 
some courts have held that the freedom to determine the curriculum resides 
with the university as long as the university’s judgment is consistent with the 
Hazelwood principle. In Bishop v. Aronov, an assistant professor of physical 
education at the University of Alabama continually referred to his Christian 
beliefs during instructional time and organized after-class meetings to further 
discuss the relationship of his religious beliefs to human physiology.162 The 
university requested that the professor cease the interjection of religion into his 
 
 155. Id. at *36. The court also recognized the academic freedom of the institution to 
incorporate multiculturalism into its curriculum: “We discern nothing in First Amendment 
jurisprudence that precludes a public university from adopting, in its exercise of its academic 
freedom, academic standards that must be satisfied by a student seeking a professional teaching 
credential even where those standards reflect a certain philosophy of education or academic 
viewpoints with which a student vehemently disagrees.” Id. at *44–45. 
 156. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274 (1988). 
 157. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289 (“[W]e hold that the Hazelwood framework is applicable 
in a university setting for speech that occurs in a classroom as part of a class curriculum.”); Head, 
2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 393, at *35 (“Student speech in school-sponsored expressive 
activities may be restricted so long as the restrictions reasonably relate to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”). 
 158. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262. 
 159. Id. at 263. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 273. 
 162. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1068–69 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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classes and after-class meetings.163 The professor sued the university for 
violating his free speech rights.164 The Eleventh Circuit, also relying on the 
Hazelwood standard of “legitimate pedagogical concerns,” held, “The 
University’s conclusions about course content must be allowed to hold sway 
over an individual professor’s judgments.”165 The Court, regarding the concept 
of academic freedom, noted: 
Though we are mindful of the invaluable role academic freedom plays in our 
public schools, particularly at the post-secondary level, we do not find support 
to conclude that academic freedom is an independent First Amendment right. 
And, in any event, we cannot supplant our discretion for that of the University. 
Federal judges should not be ersatz deans or educators. In this regard, we trust 
that the University will serve its own interests as well as those of its professors 
in pursuit of academic freedom. University officials are undoubtedly aware 
that quality faculty members will be hard to attract and retain if they are to be 
shackled in much of what they do.166 
Bishop makes clear the tension between professorial and institutional 
freedoms. In this case, the court gave deference to the university in 
determining what could be taught over what an individual professor thought 
appropriate.167 
At least one court has taken the extreme position that state university 
professors have no First Amendment interest in determining the curriculum. In 
Edwards v. California University of Pennsylvania, a tenured professor changed 
the course content of a class titled, “Introduction to Educational Media,” by 
including new material on bias, censorship, religion, and humanism.168 A 
student complained that the professor was using the class to advance religious 
ideas.169 The university administration suspended the professor with pay.170 
The professor challenged the university on First Amendment and other 
constitutional grounds.171 While acknowledging that the proper standard of 
review in certain First Amendment challenges involving state university actors 
 
 163. Id. at 1069. 
 164. Id. at 1070. 
 165. Id. at 1074, 1077. 
 166. Id. at 1075. 
 167. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074. The court also noted: 
As a place of schooling with a teaching mission, we consider the University’s authority to 
reasonably control the content of its curriculum, particularly that content imparted during 
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Id. 
 168. Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 489 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 490. 
 171. Id. 
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was the “legitimate educational interest” test, the court held that such analysis 
was unnecessary here because “we conclude that a public university professor 
does not have a First Amendment right to decide what will be taught in the 
classroom.”172 That right, the court held, was the exclusive domain of the 
university.173 
Other courts have held for the professor when universities cancel classes 
for reasons that violate the First Amendment. For example, in Dibona v. 
Matthews, the Educational Cultural Complex, which is a branch of San Diego 
Community College, cancelled a drama class that was planning to use a play 
titled “Split Second” about an African American police officer who shoots and 
kills a white suspect during the course of an arrest, after the suspect subjects 
the officer to a flurry of racial slurs.174 The police officer subsequently planted 
a knife in the hand of the victim and fabricated a self-defense justification for 
the shooting.175 The college administrators cancelled the class because it did 
not want to be subject to opposition from the community and it wanted to 
avoid a politically sensitive topic.176 The drama professor along with a student 
brought a First Amendment challenge against the college.177 The court, in 
ruling for the professor and student, held that the college’s “desire to avoid 
‘taking on’ the religious community is clearly an insufficient basis for 
cancellation of the class.”178 Further, the court observed: 
As to the “politically sensitive” nature of the play’s subject matter, not only is 
it a constitutionally inappropriate reason for censorship, ultimately it may also 
be counterproductive for the community. A central premise of the 
constitutional guaranty of free speech is that difficult and sensitive political 
issues generally benefit from constructive dialogue of the sort which might 
have been generated by “Split Second.”179 
This does not mean, however, that courts will impose a legal mandate for 
equal time for every type of expression imaginable. In his concurring opinion 
in Widmar v. Vincent, a case upholding a student religious organization’s right 
to use a university facility to conduct its meetings, Justice Stevens noted in this 
regard: 
Because every university’s resources are limited, an educational institution 
must routinely make decisions concerning the use of the time and space that is 
available for extracurricular activities. . . . I should think it obvious, for 
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example, that if two groups of 25 students requested the use of a room at a 
particular time—one to view Mickey Mouse cartoons and the other to rehearse 
an amateur performance of Hamlet—the First Amendment would not require 
that the room be reserved for the group that submitted its application first.180 
In other words, universities would still have choices to make in distributing 
limited resources. 
In summary, a professor’s curriculum choices generally supersede 
individual student curriculum preferences, unless these choices are a pretext 
for illegal discrimination. However, universities’ curriculum choices typically 
trump professorial discretion; even though some courts have found that a 
university’s discretion may be limited by free speech principles. 
d. Faculty Grading 
Some courts have held that professors have the right to assign grades to 
students. For example, in Parate v. Isibor, an associate professor of 
engineering at Tennessee State University refused to change the grade from 
“B” to “A” of a student whom he caught cheating.181 The university 
administration, after retaliating against this professor by constantly berating 
him in meetings and criticizing his teaching ability in front of his students on 
numerous occasions, eventually terminated him.182 The professor brought a 
legal challenge to his termination based partly on his right to academic 
freedom.183 In ruling, in part, for the professor, the court recognized, “Because 
the assignment of a letter grade is a symbolic communication intended to send 
a specific message to the student, the individual professor’s communicative act 
is entitled to some measure of First Amendment protection.”184 However, the 
court held that even though the university could not compel the professor to 
change the grade, thereby forcing him to submit to speech that he did not 
 
 180. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). Both Dibona 
and Widmar raise the issue of students’ free speech rights. Dibona involved a student claiming a 
right to see a controversial play, while Widmar involved a student organization’s right to use 
university facilities. See supra notes 174–180 and accompanying text. In addition, a number of 
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student activity fees such as in Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
488 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:461 
subscribe, the university retained the ultimate right to change the grade, as an 
administrative matter, on its own.185 
A different court rejected the reasoning of Parate and went even further in 
bolstering the freedom of the institution to determine student grades over the 
professor’s freedom to do so. In Brown v. Armenti, a tenured university 
professor at California University of Pennsylvania assigned a failing grade to a 
student.186 The university ordered the professor to change the grade to an 
incomplete, but the professor refused.187 The professor was terminated and 
brought suit against the university. The Third Circuit held for the university, 
reasoning, “Because grading is pedagogic, the assignment of the grade is 
subsumed under the university’s freedom to determine how a course is to be 
taught. We therefore conclude that a public university professor does not have 
a First Amendment right to expression via the school’s grade assignment 
procedures.”188 Similarly, in Lovelace v. Southeastern Massachusetts 
University, a professor challenged his termination as a violation of his First 
Amendment rights claiming that his contract was not renewed because he 
refused to inflate his grades or lower his teaching standards.189 The First 
Circuit ruled for the university noting: 
To accept plaintiff’s contention that an untenured teacher’s grading policy is 
constitutionally protected and insulates him from discharge when his standards 
conflict with those of the university would be to constrict the university in 
defining and performing its educational mission. The [F]irst [A]mendment 
does not require that each nontenured professor be made a sovereign unto 
himself.190 
Thus, in both of these cases, courts have found that the university’s educational 
judgment superseded an individual professor’s discretion. 
Also, when a court determines that a grading conflict between a university 
and a professor is over an administrative matter, such as requiring that 
professors provide clear reasons for assigned grades, the university typically 
wins. For example, in Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, a part-time English lecturer 
at the University of Toledo was terminated for refusing to comply with a 
request that she communicate more clearly to her students what was required 
to complete the coursework for her class.191 Specifically, the professor gave a 
grade of “incomplete” to thirteen of seventeen students and informed the 
students that their incompletes were assigned for one or more of three reasons: 
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1) improper formatting; 2) improper citations; and/or 3) required textual 
changes. Instead of providing individualized comments to each student, she 
left it up to the students to determine which of these reasons applied to their 
own situations.192 She claimed that “writing individualized letters would have 
interfered with the students’ learning experience and the purpose of the 
class.”193 The students complained that they did not know how to proceed and 
the administration asked her to send further clarification to the students about 
how to receive credit for the course.194 When the professor refused to comply, 
she was refused additional teaching assignments.195 The professor challenged 
this reprisal on First Amendment grounds.196 The Sixth Circuit held that the 
professor’s “First Amendment rights were not implicated” by the university’s 
request that she explain how she determined the final grades in her class.197 It 
further noted, “The freedom of a university to decide what may be taught and 
how it shall be taught would be meaningless if a professor were entitled to 
refuse to comply with university requirements whenever they conflict with his 
or her teaching philosophy.”198 
Additionally, when clear grading procedures are in place, courts are 
reluctant to give professors much discretion in deviating from such procedures. 
For example, in Wozniak v. Conry, the university required professors to grade 
on a prescribed curve and submit their grading materials for review.199 An 
engineering professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, in an 
act of defiance, refused to submit his grading materials in purposeful violation 
of this requirement.200 The professor ignored a number of requests for 
explanation by the university.201 While retaining him on the payroll, the 
university subsequently stripped the professor of his professorial 
responsibilities and privileges.202 The professor brought a challenge in court. In 
ruling for the university, the Seventh Circuit recognized, “Universities are 
entitled to assure themselves that their evaluation systems have been followed; 
otherwise their credentials are meaningless.”203 
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In sum, some courts have acknowledged professors’ rights to assign 
grades, while others have deemed this right as belonging to the university. 
Courts that acknowledge that the right resides with the professor also recognize 
that the university can change grades on student transcripts as an 
administrative act. Finally, some courts are reluctant to give professors any 
discretion around grading when clear university grading guidelines are in 
place. 
e. Freedom for Faculty Research 
Freedom for faculty research has not fared well in the courts especially 
when this interest has been weighed against state and federal laws that conflict 
with such freedom. I will summarize the law in two areas: faculty internet 
usage and travel for research purposes. 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Urofsky v. Gilmore highlighted an 
extremely restricted view of a professor’s freedom to conduct internet 
research.204 Urofsky involved a challenge to a Virginia state law that banned 
state employees from accessing “sexually explicit content” on their work 
computers without prior approval from a state agency head.205 A number of 
public university scholars from institutions located in Virginia sued in federal 
court in order to challenge the law on First Amendment academic freedom 
grounds.206 The Fourth Circuit held that the state has the power to “control the 
manner in which its employees discharge their duties and to direct its 
employees to undertake the responsibilities of their positions in a specified 
way.”207 It recognized no exception for state university professors. It further 
held that “to the extent the Constitution recognizes any right of ‘academic 
freedom’ above and beyond the First Amendment rights to which every citizen 
is entitled, the right inheres in the University, not in individual professors, and 
is not violated by the terms of the Act.”208 Not all of the sitting judges were 
convinced by this rationale. Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson’s concurring 
opinion, for example, offered some solace to proponents of academic 
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freedom.209 Although he agreed with the majority’s result, he disagreed with its 
reasoning.210 Wilkinson warned, “By embracing the Commonwealth’s view 
that all work-related speech by public employees is beyond public concern, the 
majority sanctions state legislative interference in public universities without 
limit.”211 
In another case, Loving v. Boren, a professor at the University of 
Oklahoma challenged the university’s decision to implement a policy to 
restrict a number of news groups being accessed through the university’s news 
server.212 The university developed this policy because it was concerned about 
violating a state law that made it a felony to “distribute . . . any obscene or 
indecent writing, paper, book, picture, photograph, motion picture, figure, form 
or any description or any type of obscene material.”213 Although the professor 
did not specifically claim that the university ban interfered with his right to 
conduct research, the implications of such a ban on research freedom are clear. 
In response to the professor’s challenge, the university implemented a new 
policy in which the university created two news servers.214 The “A” server 
only allowed access to news groups approved by the university.215 The “B” 
server, on the other hand, allowed full access to all news groups.216 To access 
the “B” server, the user had to be over the age of eighteen and was required to 
click a box that denoted acceptance of certain rules of usage including a 
restriction that the “B” server be used solely for academic and research 
purposes.217 The court held that this new policy was constitutional and, 
therefore, the professor’s claim was moot.218 The court also held that the 
professor’s claim was further moot because the blocked news groups on the 
“A” server could be accessed on university computers in alternative ways.219 
In a different research-related context, Emergency Coalition to Defend 
Educational Travel v. United States Department of the Treasury involved 
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federal restrictions for travel to Cuba.220 An association of academics, two 
college professors, and three undergraduates challenged the restrictions as a 
violation of their academic freedom rights.221 The plaintiffs claimed that the 
“restrictions on U.S. academic programs in Cuba unconstitutionally violate 
their rights to academic freedom under the First Amendment . . . and their 
rights to travel internationally for First Amendment purposes.”222 The D.C. 
Circuit, in ruling for the government, held that the purpose of the restrictions 
was to curtail tourism in Cuba so, therefore, was a constitutionally permissible, 
content-neutral law.223 
Thus, courts seem reluctant to protect a professor’s freedom to conduct 
research on the internet if this freedom conflicts with state or federal 
legislation. Further, deference is given to laws that restrict access to certain 
countries—even if these laws potentially inhibit a professor’s ability to 
conduct scholarly research. 
In conclusion, the seminal cases of institutional academic freedom arose 
from challenges to government authority during the McCarthy era. In all of 
these cases, institutional interests were aligned with professorial interests 
against the overreaching of state authority. The judicial opinions, thus, did not 
acknowledge any distinction between professorial and institutional rights. On 
the other hand, in cases where professorial and institutional interests diverged, 
courts used First Amendment principles to decide the disputes. When it comes 
to professorial free speech rights, the outcomes have been mixed. When 
professors conflict with their universities, some cases have held for professors 
on particular issues, while others have given great deference to universities. 
What this conflicting judicial language on the protection of various scholarly 
activities tells us is that there is no strong consensus on these matters. And this 
has been true for most of the five categories of professorial protection outlined 
above. 
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PART II:  THE LIMITATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALLY BASED ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM 
A. The Limitations of Academic Freedom Based on the First Amendment 
1. Conceptual Inconsistency: Institutional Autonomy Versus Professorial 
Rights 
Legal scholars have analyzed the principles arising from constitutional 
academic freedom in a number of law review articles. These articles generally 
emphasize the tension between institutional academic freedom and its 
professorial counterpart—particularly in cases where professorial and 
institutional interests conflict. In this Section, I will briefly summarize two 
diverging views. 
On the one hand, J. Peter Byrne argues that institutional autonomy rather 
than individual professorial rights is the proper focus of academic freedom.224 
Byrne criticizes how “academic freedom has been thought to encompass all 
First Amendment rights exercisable on a campus or by members of the 
academic community.”225 He articulates a distinction between “academic 
freedom” and “constitutional academic freedom”—the former being “a non-
legal term referring to the liberties claimed by professors through professional 
channels against administrative or political interference with research, 
teaching, and governance” and the latter being “the insulation of scholarship 
and liberal education from extramural political interference.”226 He argues for a 
very limited role for courts in protecting faculty from their schools and 
contends that the proper locus for constitutional academic freedom lies with 
the university from external interference and not with individual professors.227 
In support of his arguments, Byrne cites the history of judicial abstention in 
matters of university decision-making and the existence of state constitutional 
provisions that shield universities from undue government interference.228 
Other scholars support this view of academic freedom residing in the 
institution. For example, Paul Horowitz argues for expanded First Amendment 
protections for institutional autonomy.229 He contends that universities should 
have considerable discretion to define “what their academic mission requires, 
and their own sense of what academic freedom entails, rather than evaluate 
those claims against a top-down, judicially imposed understanding of academic 
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freedom.”230 Also, Lawrence Rosenthal argues that Garcetti properly 
recognized the “managerial prerogative” of public employers to control the 
speech of their employees—even at public universities.231 Rosenthal contends 
“the First Amendment law of managerial prerogative tolerates regulation of 
speech within the university as long as that regulation represents a bona fide 
professional judgment of academic merit consistent with scholarly norms.”232 
According to Rosenthal, academic freedom resides with the university’s 
judgment of academic merit and not with the discretion of individual 
professors. 
On the other hand, David M. Rabban contends that both institutional 
autonomy and professorial rights are protected under the broad umbrella of 
academic freedom.233 Rabban argues that even though courts have been 
presented with more institutional claims throughout history, they have 
nonetheless addressed the professorial counterpart.234 With this as his starting 
point, he contends that the concept of academic freedom moves beyond 
professionally defined norms and implicates First Amendment rights. He 
states, “Asserting constitutional protection for professors and universities is not 
simply a form of special pleading to elevate the job-related concerns of a 
particular profession or the institutional interests of a particular enterprise. 
Rather, constitutional academic freedom promotes first amendment values of 
general concern to all citizens in a democracy.”235 He concludes by arguing for 
a “functional justification” of constitutional academic freedom based on the 
distinctive roles of professors and universities in American society.236 
Similarly, other scholars support the notion that academic freedom should 
focus on professors—or at least not focus so much on institutions. For 
example, Matthew W. Finkin contends that prior judicial interpretations of 
institutional academic freedom threaten the constitutional protections of 
individual professors.237 Finkin states: 
The theory of “institutional” academic freedom would provide institutional 
authority with more than a prudential claim to judicial deference; it provides a 
constitutional shield against interventions that would not ordinarily seem 
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inappropriate, for example, judicial intervention on behalf of a faculty whose 
civil or academic rights had been infringed by the institution.238 
In these situations of proper judicial intervention, Finkin rejects the idea that 
academic freedom lies solely with the institution and argues that it should 
protect individual professors as well.239 Richard H. Hiers goes even further and 
argues that the Supreme Court’s modern interpretation of institutional 
academic freedom is incorrect because it is based on Justice Powell’s flawed 
opinion in Bakke.240 Hiers contends that contrary to Powell’s assertions, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has never before ruled that the First Amendment protected 
institutional academic freedom rights. He states: 
Arguably, as “expressive association,” academic institutions may invoke First 
Amendment academic freedom protections on behalf of their faculty and 
students. Courts may certainly defer to the expert judgment of academicians, 
or even recognize institutional autonomy “within constitutionally prescribed 
limits” whether as a matter of sound public policy or as an important state 
interest. But none of these propositions is the same as saying that colleges, 
universities or their professional schools, themselves, are entitled to the 
enjoyment of either academic freedom or autonomy under the First 
Amendment.241 
Therefore, according to Hiers, any modern ruling relying on Bakke or its 
progeny for the existence of institutional academic freedom is mistaken. 
Some scholars, therefore, argue that constitutional academic freedom 
should center on institutions, while other scholars disagree and focus on 
professorial freedom. Given the conflicting judicial interpretations that lend 
support to both views, a simple resolution based on constitutional law 
principles seems unlikely. These issues are made even more complicated based 
on the state actor requirement for First Amendment claims. 
2. The State Action Doctrine and Academic Freedom 
The full text of the First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”242 While originally only applicable to laws passed by Congress 
and not individual states, courts would later hold that the First Amendment 
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applies to the states through the Due Process Clause.243 Only government 
actors, therefore, are legally required to comply with the First Amendment. 
This is known as the state action doctrine.244 When the government is acting 
against a university, then state action is implicated in a constitutional claim. 
This is true whether the university is public or private. However, when a 
university is acting against its own faculty members, a court must determine 
whether or not the institution is a state actor before constitutional analysis can 
proceed.245 This state action inquiry is a threshold matter—i.e., an essential 
first step—for constitutional claims. If the court determines that the university 
is not a state actor, then the constitutional analysis ends. 
Implicit in this doctrine is the policy decision to provide limits, based on 
constitutional restrictions, on unfettered government authority. This is why a 
reviewing court’s first inquiry for constitutional purposes will be to determine 
the level of government involvement in the disputed decision. A purely private 
decision will not be protected by the Constitution, while a purely public 
decision will be held to judicial scrutiny. The state action doctrine creates a 
strange result for academic freedom cases in which their holdings, when based 
on First Amendment principles, only apply to state universities or private 
universities if they are deemed to be acting as state actors. But why does it 
make sense that academic freedom is constitutionally protected at a public 
institution but not at its private counterpart—especially when both higher 
educational institutions operate for the benefit of the public? In the following 
sections, I will analyze the legal contours of the public versus private 
distinction in order to problematize the concept for academic freedom 
purposes. 
a. The Murky Distinction Between Public and Private Actors Under the 
State Action Doctrine 
An infinite variety of institutional arrangements, in terms of public versus 
private, exist in American higher education, and these arrangements change 
over time. Harvard and Yale Universities, for example, began with substantial 
public support in terms of land and funding, even though they would consider 
themselves private today.246 Similarly, Tulane University started out as a 
public institution called the University of Louisiana, but evolved to the private 
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institution it is today.247 On the other hand, Rutgers started out as a private 
institution but ended up as a state university.248 Other universities are hybrids 
that retain both public and private characteristics. For example, private-charter 
institutions like Howard University, University of Pittsburgh, and Temple 
University receive substantial public funding, while public-charter institutions 
like the Universities of Delaware and Vermont demonstrate many private 
qualities.249 MIT, which is private, has been the beneficiary of federal land-
grant support since 1862 and Cornell University, which is also private, 
contains four statutory colleges that are state-funded as part of the State 
University of New York.250 Because of this infinite possibility of 
arrangements, a simple private versus public dichotomy is inadequate to trigger 
constitutional protection. Instead, courts query the level of state involvement in 
the challenged action before constitutional protection is triggered. William A. 
Kaplin and Barbara A. Lee observe: 
Due to varying patterns of government assistance and involvement, a 
continuum exists, ranging from the obvious public institution (such as a tax-
supported state university) to the obvious private institution (such as a 
religious seminary). The gray area between these poles is a subject of 
continuing debate about how much the government must be involved in the 
affairs of a “private” institution or one of its programs before it will be 
considered “public” for the purposes of the “state action” doctrine.251 
In the landmark state action case, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 
the U.S. Supreme Court noted, “Only by sifting facts and weighing 
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct 
be attributed its true significance.”252 In Burton, an African American customer 
challenged a private restaurant owner’s refusal of service, based on the 
customer’s race, on constitutional grounds.253 The restaurant was located in a 
public parking garage owned by a state entity and profits from the restaurant 
benefited the state.254 The Court found state action in the restaurant owner’s 
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refusal of service.255 Subsequent cases would engage in such context-specific 
factual sifting to determine if state action was present. 
In an early case regarding the state action issue in a private university 
context, Powe v. Miles, seven students at Alfred University, some of whom 
were studying at the New York State College of Ceramics, were dismissed for 
disrupting an awards ceremony during parents’ weekend.256 The students 
challenged their dismissal on constitutional grounds.257 The university 
subsequently moved to dismiss based on the lack of state action on the case.258 
The Second Circuit dismissed the claims against the private entity, Alfred 
University; however, it ruled that the actions of the College of Ceramics 
constituted state action.259 In finding state action at the College of Ceramics, 
the court noted: 
The State pays all the direct expenses of the College (sometimes hereafter CC). 
In addition it pays a stipulated sum per credit hour for courses taken by CC 
students in “the private sector,” with a corresponding payment by the latter for 
instruction CC gives students in other colleges. The State reimburses Alfred 
for a pro rata share of the entire administrative expense of the University 
including the salaries of the President, the Dean of Students, and other general 
officers, utilities and overhead.260 
The court also observed that the “very name of the college identifies it as a 
state institution,” and proceeded to list the numerous ways in which the 
College of Ceramics was enmeshed in state laws regarding its funding and 
operation.261 It noted: 
The State furnishes the land, buildings and equipment; it meets and evidently 
expects to continue to meet the entire budget; it requires that all receipts be 
credited against that budget, Education Law § 6102; and in the last analysis it 
can tell Alfred not simply what to do but how to do it. . . . The control of these 
student protests by the President and the Dean of Students on behalf of the 
State is an instance of positive state involvement, whether obvious or not.262 
The State of New York was, thus, so linked with the funding and operation of 
the College of Ceramics that the Second Circuit held that state action was 
present. 
Other cases would make it harder to claim state action at private 
universities. For example, in Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, a 
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federal trial court found no state action at Columbia University.263 Grossner 
involved students who brought a constitutional challenge to their disciplinary 
proceedings which were instituted as punishment for their involvement in a 
series of sit-ins.264 The students claimed the university’s receipt of substantial 
government funding created a state actor.265 The court, however, found no state 
action since “there [was] nothing . . . to suggest any substantial or relevant 
degree of interconnection between the State and the University.”266 It further 
noted that “receipt of money from the State is not, without a good deal more, 
enough to make the recipient an agency or instrumentality of the 
Government.”267 In Blackburn v. Fisk University, twelve students of Fisk 
University, which is a private institution located in Nashville, Tennessee, 
brought a constitutional challenge to their summary suspensions.268 The Sixth 
Circuit found that no state action was present.269 It observed, “State 
involvement sufficient to transform a ‘private’ university into a ‘State’ 
university requires more than merely chartering the university; providing 
financial aid in the form of public funds; or granting of tax exemptions.”270 In 
another case, Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, two law students at a private 
law school in New York challenged their dismissals on free speech grounds 
claiming that they were punished for their anti-war activities.271 The students 
contended that state action was present because the law school served a public 
function, the law school provided a path to state regulated bar admission, and 
the school received state aid and resources.272 The court, rejecting these 
arguments, found no state action.273 
Not all courts reached the same conclusion during this time. In Rackin v. 
University of Pennsylvania, for example, a professor of English challenged her 
department’s denial of her tenure application claiming that the decision was 
motivated by unlawful gender discrimination.274 The federal trial court found 
that the University of Pennsylvania was a state actor.275 It relied on the 
extensive interdependence between government and the university, including 
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the Commonwealth’s long-standing financial support, state construction, 
leasing and financing of university buildings, federal construction grants and 
contracts, public funding of research projects, tax exemptions and benefits, 
state scholarships and loan aid, university development agreements with the 
state, and other linkages.276 The court observed: 
This symbiosis becomes readily apparent when one considers the give and take 
relationship which has developed between the University and the 
Commonwealth principally because of the University’s financial dependence 
upon the Commonwealth. . . . The Commonwealth, in effect, maintains a 
stranglehold on the University and therefore potentially has significant input 
into University policies.277 
In Wahba v. New York University, on the other hand, an associate professor of 
biochemistry at the NYU School of Medicine challenged the university’s 
decision to remove him from work on a research project funded by federal 
grants.278 The Second Circuit weighed a number of factors to determine if state 
action was present, including “the degree of government involvement, the 
offensiveness of the conduct, and the value of preserving a private sector free 
from the constitutional requirements applicable to government institutions.”279 
After balancing these factors, the court found no state action to carry 
constitutional protections over to the university’s dealings with this 
professor.280 Similarly, in Greenya v. George Washington University, an 
English instructor at the U.S. Naval School of Hospital Administration, who 
taught mostly naval officers, challenged his termination from teaching.281 The 
university provided these courses to the Navy under a contractual 
agreement.282 The professor argued that since he taught government employees 
at government facilities, the university acted as a state actor.283 The court 
found no state action, observing: 
Our conclusions are predicated on the absence of any showing . . . that the 
Federal or District of Columbia Government has exercised any role in the 
management of George Washington University or has adopted a pervasive 
scheme of statutes, codes, and conditions which has the effect of regulating in 
detail the University’s management. While the determination of how much 
governmental involvement is necessary before a private institution is subject to 
constitutional limitations must be made on a case by case basis, we are clear 
that the mere receipt of government loans or funding by an otherwise private 
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university is not sufficient involvement to trigger constitutional guarantees in 
the University’s relations with its employees.284 
Arising from the multifaceted balancing of interests contained in the early 
cases, the Supreme Court subsequently articulated three specific tests to 
determine whether state action is present: (1) the symbiotic relationship test; 
(2) the nexus test; and (3) the public function test.285 First, the symbiotic 
relationship test seeks to determine the nature of the contacts between the 
private entity and the state. The foundational case for this test, Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Authority, noted that the question was whether “[t]he 
State has so far insulated itself into a position of interdependence with [the 
institution] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged 
activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been . . . ‘purely 
private.’”286 Under a finding of state action under this test, since the private 
entity’s actions are so interdependent on the government, a specified state 
linkage to the action need not be shown. Second, and narrower than the 
symbiotic relation test, the nexus test focuses on the level of state involvement 
in the particular act being challenged. According to the seminal case for this 
test, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., the question “must be whether there 
is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the 
[private] entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of 
the State itself.”287 In an important state action case involving the nexus test as 
applied to nursing homes, the Court observed: 
[O]ur precedents indicate that a State normally can be held responsible for a 
private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided 
such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in 
law be deemed to be that of the State.288 
The nexus, thus, focuses on the state’s specific involvement in the challenged 
decision. Third, the public function test focuses on the nature of the private 
entity’s particular function as compared to the traditional role of the state. The 
Court in Jackson observed that the function must be one that is “traditionally 
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exclusively reserved to the State. . . . [and] traditionally associated with 
sovereignty.”289 This test was so narrowly defined in Jackson that many 
subsequent cases have focused on the other two approaches. 
In applying these state action tests, more recent cases involving private 
educational contexts have been decided both ways—finding state action in 
some cases and no state action in others. In a leading education-specific state 
action case, Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, a number of teachers at a private school 
for troubled high school students challenged their dismissals for opposing 
school policy as in violation of their constitutional rights.290 The teachers 
argued that the school was a state actor because it received at least ninety 
percent of its funding from public subsidies and was subject to both state and 
local regulations.291 The Court, applying the nexus, symbiotic relation, and 
public function tests, found no state action when the school dismissed its 
employees.292 Similarly, in State v. Schmid, a member of the U.S. Labor Party, 
who was distributing political materials on the main campus of Princeton 
University and who was not enrolled as a student there, challenged his arrest 
and criminal charge for trespass.293 The New Jersey Supreme Court applied the 
symbiotic relation, nexus, and public function tests in analyzing whether or not 
state action was present.294 It ultimately found that the issue of state action was 
unclear for purposes of the U.S. Constitution.295 On the other hand, in two 
consolidated cases, the court reached a different result when employees of both 
the University of Pittsburgh and Temple University sued their schools on 
constitutional grounds.296 The University of Pittsburgh argued that although it 
was part of the state’s system of higher education, the state did not control its 
tenure decisions—hence, no state action was present.297 And Temple argued 
that, as a private university, the state had no control over its decisions.298 The 
court, applying the symbiotic and nexus tests, disagreed with the universities 
and found that state action existed at both places.299 In distinguishing the facts 
of Rendell-Baker, the court noted that for both Pittsburgh and Temple, the 
institutions were required by law to: (1) allow the state to control how state 
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funding would be used at the universities; (2) submit state-sponsored audits or 
make yearly reports to the state; and (3) allow the state to appoint one-third of 
their trustees.300 Indeed, the linkages between the state and the schools were so 
strong that the court observed “it would require a legislative enactment to 
disentangle Temple and Pitt from the Commonwealth.”301 As such, the 
symbiotic relation and nexus tests were satisfied at both institutions with 
regard to the challenged decisions. 
In Smith v. Duquesne University, on the other hand, a doctoral student in 
English challenged his dismissal from his program on constitutional 
grounds.302 The federal trial court, relying on the symbiotic relation and nexus 
tests, found no state action in the case.303 As to the symbiotic relation test, the 
court observed that “there [was] no statutory interrelationship between the state 
and Duquesne University: the state does not participate in the management or 
operation of Duquesne, review the institution’s expenditures, nor require the 
institution to submit voluminous financial reports to the state.”304 In applying 
the nexus test, the court then observed, “The decision to expel Smith, like the 
decision to matriculate him, turned on an academic judgment made by a purely 
private institution according to its official university policy. If indirect 
involvement is insufficient to establish state action, then certainly the lack of 
any involvement cannot suffice.”305 Similarly, in Imperiale v. Hahnemann 
University, a doctor challenged the university’s decision to revoke his medical 
degree.306 The court, in applying the symbiotic relation and nexus tests, found 
no state action by Hahnemann University.307 And in Logan v. Bennington 
College Corp., in a case where a professor challenged his dismissal for sexual 
harassment on due process grounds, the court found no state action under the 
nexus test.308 The court noted, “His termination was neither imposed by the 
acts of state officials acting alone or in concert with College officials, nor 
imposed by Bennington in the belief that it was required by law.”309 
However, in other cases, courts have found state action at private 
universities. In Doe v. Gonzaga University, a former education student sued 
Gonzaga on civil rights grounds claiming that the university spread false 
allegations that he had sexually assaulted another student.310 The student won 
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at trial and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s finding of state 
action, holding “[w]here there is joint action of the sort described at trial, the 
jury had substantial evidence to find that action under color of state law is 
present.”311 Further, in Craft v. Vanderbilt University, the former subjects of 
experiments involving the not-consented-to exposure of radioactive iron 
isotopes sued the university under federal civil rights laws.312 The federal 
district court, under the symbiotic relation test, found that a reasonable jury 
could have found that Vanderbilt was a state actor.313 It noted, “The two parties 
appear to have cooperatively agreed to combine their respective nutrition study 
efforts to promote public welfare and avoid conflict or duplication of efforts 
. . . .”314 
The inconsistency of results regarding the state action doctrine in higher 
education is a reflection of the almost infinite variation of public and private 
institutions around the country. On one end of the spectrum, institutions such 
as University of Pittsburgh and Temple University have been found to have 
such pervasive overlap with government that they have been deemed an 
instrumentality of the state. On the other end, institutions such as Duquesne 
have had such little government involvement in its affairs that constitutional 
protections have been held inapplicable on their campuses. Other cases have 
fallen somewhere in between. In all of these cases, mere state funding has not 
been enough to establish state action; but public subsidies along with some 
degree of state governance over campus affairs can tip the scales toward 
finding state action. With respect to protecting academic freedom at American 
universities, this state action inquiry leaves much to be desired. Evan G. S. 
Siegel, in an article about free student speech on college campuses, critiques 
state action analysis for purposes of academic freedom, observing: 
The educational mission of a university, whether public or private, includes the 
promotion of the free exchange of ideas, the pursuit of knowledge, and a 
tolerance of diversity in opinion. Few institutions better exemplify “the 
marketplace of ideas.” A student who chooses to attend a private college 
instead of an equally reputable state university assumes that he will receive at 
least the same quality of education and expects that he will enjoy the same 
kind of freedom and independence he would have at a public institution.315 
In other words, why should academic freedom be protected on some campuses 
and not others simply based on the degree of state involvement on campus 
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decision-making? Are there other ways of protecting professorial rights at both 
public and private universities? 
In the next section, I will explore some areas of state law that collapse the 
public/private distinction to illustrate such alternative, albeit state-specific, 
legal mechanisms. I am not arguing for the deletion of the state action 
requirement in First Amendment analysis. Instead, I am exploring different 
legal mechanisms that would apply to both public and private universities. 
b. Examples of Special State Laws That Apply to Both Public and 
Private Universities 
Not all laws treat public- and private-entity universities differently. Indeed, 
some laws actually collapse the distinction between public and private in order 
to ensure fairness in both types of institutions. These laws are not restricted in 
their application by the state actor requirement. They, therefore, treat both state 
and private actors in the same manner. The relevant inquiry under these laws is 
whether the challenged action itself is legal, and not the level of state 
involvement of the actor. In this section, I will give two unique examples 
arising under state laws. 
i. Article 78 Proceedings in New York 
Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) provides 
for an expedited court proceeding against a body or officer.316 The law defines 
“body or officer” as “every court, tribunal, board, corporation, officer, or other 
person, or aggregation of persons, whose action may be affected by a 
proceeding under this article.”317 And the questions that can be raised at the 
proceeding include, in relevant part: 
1. [W]hether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it by 
law; or 
2. [W]hether the body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is about to 
proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction; or 
3. [W]hether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was 
affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of 
discretion, including abuse of discretion as to the measure or mode of penalty 
or discipline imposed . . . .318 
While Article 78 proceedings typically arise from challenges to government 
action, private entities—including private universities—are not immune from 
them. In the oft-cited case of Gray v. Canisius College of Buffalo, the New 
York appellate court noted: 
 
 316. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801–06 (McKinney 2008). 
 317. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7802 (McKinney 2008). 
 318. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803 (McKinney 2008). 
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Historically, a writ of mandamus has been made applicable to corporations, 
both public and private, because these institutions are creations of the 
government and a supervisory or visitorial power is always impliedly reserved 
to see that corporations act agreeably to the end of the institution, that they 
keep within the limits of their lawful powers, and to correct and punish abuses 
of their franchises. These corporations, having accepted a charter and having 
thus become a quasi-governmental body can be compelled in an article 78 
proceeding to fulfill not only obligations imposed upon them by state or 
municipal statutes but also those imposed by their internal rules. Thus, courts 
have traditionally reviewed the action of private colleges and universities in 
cases where it was alleged that the institution had failed to follow its own 
hearing or review procedures in the discipline of a student or the dismissal of 
a faculty member.319 
Unlike the state action doctrine for purposes of constitutional analysis, 
therefore, Article 78 treats private universities as per se quasi-governmental 
entities that are subject to judicial review to ensure compliance with their own 
internal rules and other legal duties. In Gray, a tenured professor and chair of 
the elementary education department at Canisius College challenged her 
termination of employment.320 She claimed that the college unfairly dismissed 
her because she commenced criminal proceedings against one of her 
colleagues that cast her employer and the colleague in a negative light.321 The 
professor was terminated after the colleague was found not guilty after a bench 
trial.322 Her subsequent Article 78 petition was dismissed by the trial court; 
however, the intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision.323 
The Fourth Department ordered the proceeding to go forward “to determine 
whether respondents’ action in terminating Dr. Gray’s services violated the 
college rules and was arbitrary and capricious, i.e., whether the respondents 
complied with their own rules concerning tenure and properly exercised their 
discretion in terminating Dr. Gray’s services.”324 
In Gertler v. Goodgold, a tenured faculty member at NYU School of 
Medicine challenged his termination based on contract and tort theories.325 The 
court found no duty in contract or tort for NYU to be liable under those 
theories and held that the professor should have commenced an Article 78 
proceeding instead.326 The court noted: 
 
 319. Gray v. Canisius Coll. of Buffalo, 430 N.Y.S.2d 163, 166 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 320. Id. at 164. 
 321. Id. at 167. 
 322. Id. at 164–65. 
 323. Id. at 168. 
 324. Gray, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 168. 
 325. Gertler v. Goodgold, 487 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). 
 326. Id. at 569–70, 572. 
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[H]aving accepted a State charter and being subject to the broad policy-making 
jurisdiction of the Regents of the University of the State of New York, a single 
corporate entity of which they are deemed a part, private colleges and 
universities are accountable in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding, with its well-
defined standards of judicial review, for the proper discharge of their self-
imposed as well as statutory obligations.327 
The court further observed that “the judgment of professional educators is 
subject to judicial scrutiny to the extent that the appropriate inquiry may be 
made to determine whether they abided by their own rules, and whether they 
have acted in good faith or their action was arbitrary or irrational.”328 
However, since the four-month statute of limitations for commencing Article 
78 proceedings had expired, the professor was ultimately left without a legal 
venue to pursue his claims.329 
Similarly, in Maas v. Cornell University, a tenured psychology professor 
sued Cornell, challenging the disciplinary action against him for breaching the 
university’s sexual harassment policy.330 The professor sued on contract and 
tort grounds; however, the court found no duty imposed by Cornell based on 
these theories.331 The court held that the professor should have brought an 
Article 78 proceeding against this private university, but he was now time-
barred from doing so.332 Another recent case reached a similar result. In 
Padiyar v. Albert Einstein College of Medicine, a student sued his medical 
school, a private entity, for its decision to terminate him as a candidate from its 
joint M.D./Ph.D. program.333 The student couched his claims in unlawful 
discrimination and breach of contract terms.334 The court held that the student 
should have brought an Article 78 proceeding instead, but he was now time-
barred from doing so.335 
Article 78’s treatment of private universities is illustrative of how the 
public versus private distinction does not have to be determinative in deciding 
whether or not a court has the authority to intervene in a dispute. New York’s 
law has a much broader view of when judicial review over a private 
university’s actions is proper than the federal state action doctrine allows. 
Indeed, based on Article 78 case law, jurisdiction is proper as long as the 
 
 327. Id. at 569–70 (citations omitted). 
 328. Id. at 570. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Maas v. Cornell Univ., 721 N.E.2d 966, 967 (N.Y. 1999). 
 331. Id. at 967–68, 970. 
 332. Id. at 969. 
 333. Padiyar v. Albert Einstein Coll. of Med. of Yeshiva Univ., No. 116296/06, 2009 WL 
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private university promulgates its own rules—a condition that is almost always 
satisfied. This expansive jurisdiction over both public and private entities 
indicates a certain policy choice that runs counter to the federal state action 
doctrine. Specifically, for Article 78 purposes, ensuring that both public and 
private institutions are being fair takes priority over restricting unfettered state 
authority. 
ii. The Leonard Law in California 
State legislatures can also address whether they will impose different rules 
on public and private universities. For example, in California, the legislature 
passed a law that collapsed the distinction for First Amendment purposes. The 
Leonard Law provides, in pertinent part: 
No private postsecondary educational institution shall make or enforce any rule 
subjecting any student to disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of conduct 
that is speech or other communication that, when engaged in outside the 
campus or facility of a private postsecondary institution, is protected from 
governmental restriction by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution . . . .336 
The Leonard Law allows a private cause of action for students who are harmed 
by a violation of this law and authorizes attorney’s fees for a prevailing 
plaintiff. The law exempts institutions controlled by religious organizations. 
This statute is California’s attempt to provide free speech protection at private 
universities. 
One of the first litigated challenges brought under the Leonard Law was 
Corry v. Stanford University. In Corry, a number of university students sued to 
challenge Stanford’s speech code.337 Stanford’s speech code was “intended to 
clarify the point at which free expression ends and prohibited discriminatory 
harassment begins.”338 Prohibited speech included “discriminatory intimidation 
by threats of violence and also . . . personal vilification of students on the basis 
of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and 
ethnic origin.”339 The code defined speech as constituting personal vilification 
if it: 
a) [I]s intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small number of 
individuals on the basis of their race, sex, color, handicap, religion, sexual 
orientation, or national and ethnic origin; and 
b) [I]s addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or 
stigmatizes; and 
 
 336. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 1992). 
 337. Corry v. Stanford Univ., No. 740309, at 1, 4 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995) 
(order granting preliminary injunction). 
 338. Id. at 2. 
 339. Id. 
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c) [M]akes use of insulting or “fighting” words or non-verbal symbols.340 
Two main issues emerged during the litigation. The first issue was whether 
the speech code was constitutional. Stanford argued that the speech restricted 
by its code was not protected by the First Amendment.341 Instead, the 
restrictions targeted only “fighting words,” which are not protected by the 
Constitution under the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire.342 On the other hand, the students argued that the speech code 
impaired their First Amendment rights, as applied to Stanford under the 
Leonard Law.343 The second issue was whether the Leonard Law was 
constitutional. Stanford argued, among other things, that as an institution of 
higher education, it is protected by academic freedom to be free from state 
infringement on its educational decisions—including the creation of a 
respectful campus atmosphere.344 The students, on the other hand, argued that 
the Leonard Law was a valid exercise of the state’s power to regulate the 
protection of free speech on a private campus.345 
The court held for the students on both issues.346 First, the court analyzed 
the speech code under the fighting words doctrine and determined that it did 
not seek to limit only fighting words, but “particular ideas and constitutionally 
protected speech.”347 Further, the court noted that cases after Chaplinsky 
narrowed the fighting words doctrine to prohibit intentional speech that would 
“likely cause an imminent breach of the peace.”348 It held that the code was 
overly broad in that it barred speech that may just hurt feelings and not 
produce imminent violence.349 In other words, since the code was neither 
content-neutral nor outcome-specific, it did not pass constitutional muster. 
Next, the court analyzed the constitutionality of the Leonard Law.350 I making 
short shrift of Stanford’s academic freedom argument, the court observed: 
 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 3. 
 342. Corry, No. 740309, at 3. See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569–72, 
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 343. Corry, No. 740309, at 3. 
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color, creed, religion, or gender—but not others. Id. at 10–12 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
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 348. Corry, No. 740309, at 9. 
 349. Id. at 20. 
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Defendants incorrectly suggest that “academic freedom” provides them with 
carte blanche to do what they wish. Both Regents of University of California v. 
Bakke and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, cases relied upon by the Defendants, 
discuss academic freedom in the context of academic decisions. The Speech 
Code, however, has nothing to do with any of the four academic freedoms the 
Supreme Court has established.351 
Thus, the court found the Leonard Law constitutional and not a violation of 
academic freedom. 
On March 9, 1995, Stanford President Gerhard Casper issued a response to 
the decision.352 Casper disagreed with the court’s opinion.353 He maintained 
that the university speech rule was not overbroad and the Leonard Law was 
unconstitutional.354 He first argued that the speech restriction relied on the 
fighting words exception to the First Amendment and should have been 
upheld.355 As to the second issue, Casper asserted that he disagreed with the 
court that the speech regulation had nothing to do with academic freedom as 
set forth in Sweezy.356 He contended that almost all other states respect their 
universities’ discretion to set their own educational policies—policies like the 
regulation of hate speech.357 However, he stated that in order to preserve 
Stanford’s limited resources, the university would not appeal the decision.358 
The dispute in Corry provides an example of how a state legislature can 
collapse the distinction between private and public actors through the 
enactment of laws. In this case, First Amendment principles are applied at a 
private university through a legislative rule. State action analysis was, 
therefore, not necessary. California lawmakers decided that maintaining free 
speech at both public and private universities was more important than just 
fettering the power of the state to control people’s expression. California, 
however, is the only state with such a law. 
In sum, Article 78 in New York and the Leonard Law in California provide 
two examples of legal mechanisms that collapse the public/private distinction. 
These laws, however, are state-specific so they do not offer broad protection to 
 
 351. Id. at 36 (citations omitted). In Sweezy, Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence acknowledged 
a university’s freedom “to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be 
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.” Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 
354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 352. Gerhard Casper, Statement on Corry vs. Stanford University President Gerhard Casper, 
Stanford University Faculty Senate, STANFORD U. NEWS SERV. (Mar. 9, 1995), http://news.stan 
ford.edu/pr/95/950309Arc5331.html. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Casper, supra note 352. 
 358. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] A CONTRACT THEORY OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 511 
professors outside their respective states. In other words, they are unable to 
adequately fill the broad gaps left by constitutionally based academic freedom. 
I will detail these gaps in the next section before suggesting a more 
comprehensive alternative to the First Amendment. 
3. The Inadequacy of First Amendment-Based Academic Freedom Law 
and the Need for an Alternative Legal Foundation 
The state action doctrine, as required in First Amendment analysis, 
prioritizes the limitation of unfettered state power. As part of this doctrine, the 
theoretical focus is on how much governmental involvement is ideal in 
university decisions. On the one end of the spectrum is complete government 
control over university decisions. This would not be the best way to protect 
academic freedom. The McCarthy era, while not a complete government take-
over of universities, came close. During this time, inquiry into unpopular 
subjects and theories was severely chilled and academic freedom suffered. On 
the other end lies complete institutional autonomy for university decisions. 
This, too, would be less than ideal. For decades, federal, state, and local laws 
have shielded professors at both public and private universities from 
discriminatory treatment by the universities based on race, gender, sexual 
orientation and other protected categories. Other laws have ensured fair 
employment practices and safe workplaces and numerous other employee 
benefits. And others have imposed ethical duties on research involving human 
subjects. In a world with complete institutional autonomy, such reasonable 
external interference into the internal decision-making of the university would 
be prohibited. This unlimited discretion would lead to unjust outcomes that 
externally imposed laws were implemented to prevent. Courts have struggled 
to find the ideal middle ground between these two extremes. The balancing of 
the proper amount of government involvement in university affairs makes 
sense for cases in which the state is interfering with educational decision-
making at both public and private universities. This has been the typical case. 
In such disputes, institutional and professorial interests are aligned. For 
example, in Bakke and subsequent cases allowing public universities to 
consider race in the selection of their students, the interests of the universities 
in the educational benefits of diversity were not in conflict with professorial 
interests.359 The Court, therefore, made no distinction between professorial and 
institutional academic freedom when it discussed this freedom in the opinions. 
When the interests between institutions and professors diverge, however, 
the state action limitation precludes judicial resolution of academic freedom 
issues at private institutions. J. Peter Byrne observes, “[T]he state action 
doctrine mandates judicial enforcement of constitutional liberties against 
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institutional infringements for half the nation’s academics and denies it to the 
other half for reasons which, if desirable at all, are very far removed from the 
realities of academic life.”360 These reasons focus on restricting state power. 
But when professors are involved in disputes with universities, regardless of 
the level of state involvement, the most relevant inquiry should be how we can 
best protect the principles of academic freedom for the benefit of society. 
However, the state action doctrine will preclude any analysis at most private 
universities. For example, in a case where a private university (i.e., a private 
university not deemed a state actor) is attempting to unduly restrict the 
scholarly work of a professor, no constitutional remedy would be available. In 
other words, the state action doctrine would preclude a constitutional analysis 
even when a state university professor would be protected in the same 
situation. The application of state action, thus, creates illogical results because 
vastly different legal outcomes would arise depending on whether the 
university is public or private even though the purposes of higher education at 
both types of institutions would be the same. 
In addition, for universities that are restricted by the First Amendment (i.e., 
state actors), the principles arising from public employee free speech cases 
have been inadequate to protect the academic freedom of professors at state 
universities. For example, the Fourth Circuit in Urofsky noted that there are no 
constitutionally based academic freedom rights for professors—these rights, if 
they exist at all, belong solely to the institution.361 This holding, if followed by 
other courts, has dire implications as to the scant level of protection that 
professors will be afforded under a constitutional theory of academic freedom. 
Furthermore, regarding non-classroom-related speech, cases post Garcetti have 
struggled with how to apply the Garcetti reservation to state university 
professors. While courts have afforded professors some protection when they 
are teaching their students, their expression in other contexts has not fared as 
well.362 Indeed, most of the rulings have simply ignored the reservation, 
meaning that professors, even at state universities, are without constitutional 
protection because almost all of their disputed speech has been held to have 
been pursuant to their official duties. Both Urofsky and Garcetti, as applied to 
university professors have therefore, created a situation in which constitutional 
academic freedom for professors is on extremely shaky footing.  
 A new legal foundation for professorial academic freedom is sorely 
needed. In order to expand the academic freedom protections for all university 
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professors, regardless of the state involvement at their institutions, the proper 
theoretical focus should be on how we can ensure that universities act in a way 
that maximizes the social benefits of higher education. The policy statements 
of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP)—“the single 
most influential and important defender of professional tenure and academic 
freedom” —embody this focus.363 For example, one of the AAUP’s most 
influential policy statements, the 1940 Statement of Principles of Academic 
Freedom and Tenure, acknowledged, “Institutions of higher education are 
conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the 
individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends 
upon the free search for truth and its free expression.”364 The AAUP made no 
distinction between public and private universities. Both were “conducted for 
the common good.”365 As such, the AAUP’s normative statements regarding 
academic freedom at American universities contain no state action 
requirement. They apply to all American universities whose mission is the 
unfettered search for truth. 
For the same reasons that the unique statutory twists based on state law pay 
no heed to state actor requirements—e.g., review of private universities in 
Article 78 proceedings and the application of the Leonard Law to private 
institutions—I contend that protecting academic freedom at both public and 
private American universities is more important “for the common good” than 
restricting only state action. Thus, I urge an alternative mechanism that would 
protect professorial rights on a wider scale. I turn away from constitutional law 
and explore other sources of law that will allow this to happen. In my 
exploration, I not only aim to expand academic freedom protections for 
professors at both public and private institutions, but also to find a legal 
foundation that will permit the recognition of AAUP policies as guideposts in 
adjudicating professorial academic freedom rights. 
In a context related to professorial rights, some courts have attempted to 
protect student rights at private universities by common law principles when 
constitutional protection was unavailable due to the state actor doctrine. The 
author of a Yale Law Journal article contends: 
The common law protects valuable interests of individuals and groups from 
arbitrary deprivation or unreasonable injury if those interests have enterprise-
worth or are deemed inherently worthwhile under the prevailing social ethic. 
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Students at private universities have an interest sufficiently valuable under 
these tests that the courts should protect it against arbitrary deprivation.366 
As applied to the academic freedom rights of a private university professor, 
this property-based associational right is a clumsy solution, at best. I can 
envision a claim for these rights arising when a professor at a private university 
has been discharged in violation of academic freedom principles. A reliance on 
private associational rights to protect this professor, however, does not take 
into consideration the unique context of higher education and the special 
purpose of this enterprise. The same analysis would apply to any private 
entity—from boating club to social club to private university. This broad 
framework would, thus, be insufficient in dealing with professorial rights 
because it would fail to take into account the ideals of academic freedom and 
the social utility of higher education. Furthermore, this analysis of private 
associational rights would create a body of law that excludes analysis at public 
institutions. Academic freedom predicated on these common law rights would, 
therefore, create separate rules for private versus public entities—much like the 
state action doctrine has done. 
In order to take into account the unique context of American higher 
education, I propose an alternative foundation of academic freedom grounded 
in contract law. Contract law allows the recognition of AAUP’s principles as 
interpretive guideposts in adjudicating disputes between professors and their 
universities. This organization’s rich history in protecting academic freedom 
has significant bearing on the reasonable expectations of modern-day 
professors and universities regarding academic freedom rights. Further, unlike 
First Amendment analysis, contract law makes no distinction between state and 
private actors. The agreement controls the rights and duties of the parties, both 
public and private. Also, unlike First Amendment analysis, contract law allows 
for the recognition of professors as something more than just public 
employees. Specifically, it permits inquiry into rights and duties based on the 
reasonable understandings of the parties and, in some situations, guided by the 
norms and customs of the scholarly profession as a whole, as to what academic 
freedom entails rather than predicating the analysis on public employee status. 
Finally, contract law may provide better-tailored remedies than constitutional 
law could in academic disputes. Contract law attempts to make parties whole 
in the event of a breach of an agreement. In other words, it looks to the 
expectations of the parties to see where the aggrieved party would be if the 
breaching party performed under the agreement and tries to make up the 
difference by awarding monetary damages or other remedies. Remedies under 
contract law are typically context-specific and narrow. They arise from the 
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mutual assent of the parties in a myriad of higher educational contexts. 
Contract law is flexible enough to encompass such contextual differences 
because it leaves room for the understanding of the parties to change 
depending on the different types of institutions involved. Constitutional law, 
on the other hand, attempts to fashion remedies that conform to constitutional 
principles. It looks to judicial interpretations of these principles and tries to 
make rules that apply to any particular dispute based on these interpretations. 
Constitutional remedies, therefore, tend to be broad and far-reaching. They 
arise from general principles and apply to specific situations across the 
country. Based on the wide range of disputes that can arise under the umbrella 
of professorial academic freedom, contract remedies provide the necessary 
specificity to consider each unique campus context and allow for the crafting 
of tailored remedies that take into account the reasonable expectations of the 
parties. Constitutional law’s broader remedies, on the other hand, do not allow 
sufficient flexibility to tailor remedies to different contexts. 
Although constitutional protections would remain available to professors at 
state universities, I have argued in this part that they are insufficient. 
Therefore, I urge that plaintiffs and judges rely on an alternative contractual 
basis for academic freedom that provides more comprehensive protection for 
professors across the country. 
Some lower courts have recognized a contractual basis for academic 
freedom rights. I will outline this alternative foundation in the final part. 
PART III:  A CONTRACT THEORY OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
A. An Alternative Foundation for Professorial Academic Freedom: Contract 
Law 
1. Express Contractual Terms 
A contract is “[a]n agreement between two or more parties creating 
obligations that are enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law.”367 The 
formation of a contract requires “a bargain in which there is a manifestation of 
mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.”368 In contract disputes, 
courts will try to determine what the parties intended when entering into the 
agreement. 
 
 367. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (10th ed. 2014). 
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Contractual duties can arise from the express terms of an agreement. An 
express contract is an agreement “whose terms the parties have explicitly set 
out.”369 For example, some universities detail the rights and obligations of their 
professors as part of their faculty handbooks. A number of courts have given 
the provisions of such handbooks contractual status. In Sola v. Lafayette 
College, a college professor, alleging gender discrimination, brought a breach 
of contract action against her college after she was denied tenure.370 The Third 
Circuit held that language in the faculty handbook regarding affirmative action 
could have contractual status and provided the faculty member with a cause of 
action based on breach of this provision.371 Similarly, in Arneson v. Board of 
Trustees, McKendree College, a college professor at McKendree College who 
was terminated from employment brought a breach of contract action arguing 
that he did not receive the proper notice as required by the faculty handbook.372 
The Appellate Court of Illinois held that the handbook was legally binding 
because the college caused its faculty to rely on the manual as part of the “rules 
and regulations of the College” to which both parties were subject.373 
Duties may also arise from express terms contained in faculty handbooks 
but read in the unique context of higher education. In Greene v. Howard 
University, five non-tenured faculty members were terminated without notice 
or hearing for their involvement in campus disturbances.374 The professors 
asserted “that the University failed in its obligation, incident to their contracts, 
to give the appropriate advance notice of non-renewal.”375 The D.C. Circuit 
noted that even though the faculty handbook was not incorporated by reference 
into the employment agreement, it nonetheless “governs the relationship 
between faculty members and the University.”376 When the university pointed 
to a disclaimer in the faculty handbook that denied any contractual obligations 
created by the words contained in the handbook, the court refused to honor this 
disclaimer, observing: 
Contracts are written, and are to be read, by reference to the norms of conduct 
and expectations founded upon them. This is especially true of contracts in and 
among a community of scholars, which is what a university is. The readings of 
the market place are not invariably apt in this non-commercial context.377 
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The court found in favor of the professors noting that, despite the disclaimer, 
the provisions in the faculty handbook gave the professors the right to 
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.378 As Greene suggests, some 
courts will emphasize that the interpretation of contractual obligations will rest 
on the particular context of higher education, which is unlike the commercial 
realm, even to the point of invalidating explicit disclaimers contained in 
faculty handbooks.379 
Alternative sources of express contractual duties may include letters of 
appointment combined with institutional rules. In Brady v. Board of Trustees 
of the Nebraska State Colleges, a tenured professor of history at Wayne State 
College was terminated without a hearing after the college’s budget was 
reduced.380 The professor challenged his summary dismissal based on a breach 
of contract theory.381 His employment contract “specifically included the 
college bylaws, policies, and practices relating to academic tenure, and faculty 
dismissal procedures.”382 The court, in ruling that the denial of due process 
breached provisions of the college bylaws, observed: 
There can be no serious question but that the bylaws of the governing body 
with respect to termination and conditions of employment became a part of the 
employment contract between the college and Brady. At the time of the offer 
and acceptance of initial appointment . . . , Brady was advised in writing that 
the offer and acceptance of appointment at Wayne constituted a contract 
honoring the policies and practices set forth in the faculty handbook, which 
was furnished to him at that time.383 
AAUP policy documents, when incorporated by reference in employment 
agreements, can also form the basis of contractual obligations between 
professors and their universities. Specifically, these documents can elucidate 
the norms and shared understandings between the parties. Indeed, some courts 
have relied on AAUP policy statements to determine if a breach of contract 
occurred in certain situations. For example, in Browzin v. Catholic University 
of America, a tenured professor of engineering was terminated due to 
conditions of “financial exigency” and, in determining if a breach of contract 
occurred, the court faced the issue of whether the professor’s termination was 
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consistent with the AAUP’s definition of this concept.384 The parties stipulated 
that the 1968 AAUP regulations were incorporated by the contract between the 
professor and university.385 In ruling for the university, the court relied on a 
number of AAUP materials outside the 1968 regulations to interpret the 
agreement, stating: 
Those materials include statements widely circulated and widely accepted by a 
large number of organizations involved in higher education (such as the 1925 
Conference Statement and the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure), as well as guidelines and reports issued by the AAUP as 
a result of its investigations into incidents where principles of academic 
freedom or tenure have allegedly been violated. . . . As to the former 
documents—the widely accepted statements—the propriety of our considering 
them in interpreting the contract here could hardly be questioned. They form a 
kind of legislative history for the 1968 Regulations, and they do represent 
widely shared norms within the academic community, having achieved 
acceptance by organizations which represent teachers as well as organizations 
which represent college administrators and governing boards.386 
Collective bargaining agreements can also provide express terms that 
merge professional norms with contractual duties. This has not always been so. 
In 1919, the president of the AAUP, Arthur Lovejoy, declared “three decisive 
reasons” why the AAUP should not be part of a labor union.387 First, he noted 
that the majority of university professors would not be part of a faculty union 
in the near future so pursuing this organizational form would be divisive to the 
profession.388 Second, Lovejoy observed that labor unions’ primary objectives 
are to increase wages, diminish the hours of labor, and improve working 
conditions for wage earners.389 However, university professors are different 
from other wage earners because they “are responsible officers of institutions 
created by the state or by the voluntary gifts of other men for public ends—for 
the maintenance of one of the highest and most important functions in the life 
of society.”390 As such, labor unions are not capable of representing the 
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interests of university professors, which include enabling “the profession . . . to 
discharge their distinctive function in the economy of modern society with the 
highest degree of competency and serviceableness.”391 Third, he argued that a 
university professor is “a professional investigator of social problems” and 
“ought to avoid entangling permanent alliances with any of the purely 
economic groups which are now struggling with one another to retain or to 
increase their shares of the social dividend.”392 
By the 1970s, the AAUP’s conception of itself in relation to collective 
bargaining would change. While in its early years, the AAUP insisted it was 
unlike a union and more like a professional association akin to the American 
Bar and American Medical Associations, by 1970, General Secretary Bertram 
A. Davis signaled a break from this idea: 
It is a mistake to conclude, as many do, that the American Association of 
University Professors should model its policies after those of the American Bar 
Association or the American Medical Association. However estimable those 
associations may be, their policies have been adapted to the fact that members 
of the legal and medical professions are largely self-employed and deal 
directly with the public. Members of the academic profession of course are not 
self-employed, and it is their institutions rather than they which deal directly 
with the public.393 
Philo A. Hutcheson notes that, in the following years, AAUP leadership 
pursued “a cautious yet oddly determined development of collective 
bargaining.”394 
By 1973, the AAUP issued a “Statement on Collective Bargaining” that 
provided, “The longstanding programs of the Association are means to achieve 
a number of basic ends at colleges and universities: the enhancement of 
academic freedom and tenure; of due process; of sound academic government. 
Collective bargaining, properly used, is essentially another means to achieve 
these ends.”395 The AAUP was, therefore, endorsing collective bargaining 
agreements as mechanisms that could fuse professional norms with express 
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contractual obligations. Modern examples include agreements in which the 
AAUP is designated as the official bargaining representative.396 In these 
agreements, AAUP policies are typically included as contract provisions. Kent 
State’s collective bargaining agreement is a particularly detailed example of 
academic freedom that arises from contract. Article IV, titled “Academic 
Freedom and Professional Responsibility,” provides: 
Section 1. The parties recognize that membership in the academic profession 
carries with it both special rights and also special responsibilities. Accordingly, 
the parties reaffirm their mutual commitment to the concepts of academic 
freedom and professional responsibility. 
Section 2. As stated in the American Association of University Professors’ 
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Faculty 
members are entitled to freedom in research and in the publication of the 
results, subject to the adequate performance of their other academic duties. The 
principles of academic freedom and freedom of inquiry shall be interpreted to 
include freedom of expression in both traditional print and newly-emerging 
electronic formats such as the creation of digital images, web sites, or home 
pages. 
Faculty members are entitled to freedom in the classroom (including the virtual 
classroom) in discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to 
introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their 
subject. In making public statements—including the exercise of the right to 
responsible dissent on matters of institutional policy or educational 
philosophy—members of the Faculty have an obligation to be accurate, to 
exercise appropriate restraint, to show respect for the opinions of others and to 
make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the University. 
Section 3. As stated in the American Association of University Professors’ 
1966 Statement on Professional Ethics, Faculty members, in exercising their 
professional roles as teacher, scholar and colleague, accept the obligation to 
exercise critical self-discipline and judgment in using, extending and 
transmitting knowledge, and to practice intellectual honesty in accord with the 
standards of expectation of their respective disciplines and of the University’s 
Faculty Code of Professional Ethics.397 
Further, consistent with AAUP policies, the Kent State agreement also 
includes provisions for faculty participation in policy and details on the tenure 
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process.398 Collective bargaining agreements that employ such language, thus, 
create academic freedom obligations for both professors and their universities. 
These contracts, therefore, can provide an additional and especially robust 
source of academic freedom rights and duties. 
In recent years, most academic unionization has occurred at state 
universities rather than their private counterparts. The expansion of faculty 
collective bargaining into private universities essentially ceased after NLRB v. 
Yeshiva University,399 where the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1980 that 
Yeshiva professors were “managerial employees,” and thus excluded from 
coverage under the National Labor Relations Act—a federal law that 
guaranteed collective bargaining rights to private-sector employees, but not to 
managers. After Yeshiva, most private universities could elect to, but were no 
longer required to, recognize faculty unions as official bargaining 
representatives. Despite this decision, a number of AAUP chapters at private 
universities continue to maintain the benefits and protections of collective 
bargaining.400 Public university professors, not affected by Yeshiva, continue to 
engage in collective bargaining pursuant to state laws. 
2. Implicit Contractual Terms 
When a written agreement does not exist or does not capture the full intent 
of the parties, contractual obligations can be implicit. There are two types of 
implicit contracts: implied-in-fact and implied-in-law. Implied-in-fact contracts 
are agreements “that the parties presumably intended as their tacit 
understanding, as inferred from their conduct and other circumstances.”401 An 
implied-in-law contract is a duty “created by law for the sake of justice, 
[specifically], an obligation imposed by law because of some special 
relationship between them or because one of them would otherwise be unjustly 
enriched.”402 As evidenced by case law, the most relevant type for my analysis 
is the implied-in-fact agreement. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Perry v. Sindermann, a case involving a 
professor’s challenge to his termination based on his public criticism of the 
Board of Regents, explained the difference between express and implied-in-
fact terms as it related to the dispute at hand: 
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[T]he law of contracts in most, if not all, jurisdictions long has employed a 
process by which agreements, though not formalized in writing, may be 
“implied.” Explicit contractual provisions may be supplemented by other 
agreements implied from “the promisor’s words and conduct in light of the 
surrounding circumstances.” And, “[t]he meaning of [the promisor’s] words 
and acts is found by relating them to the usage of the past. . . .” 
. . . . [S]o there may be an unwritten “common law” in a particular university 
that certain employees shall have the equivalent of tenure. This is particularly 
likely in a college or university, like Odessa Junior College, that has no 
explicit tenure system even for senior members of its faculty, but that 
nonetheless may have created such a system in practice.403 
The Court, therefore, recognized the possible existence of implied-in-fact 
“common law” practices in a particular university based on the academic 
custom and usage of that university.404 In another case employing custom and 
usage analysis, Bason v. American University, an assistant professor of law 
was denied tenure, and he challenged this decision as a breach of contract.405 
He claimed that the university failed to give him feedback on his tenure 
progress.406 In reversing summary judgment for the university, the D.C. Court 
of Appeals noted: 
As we interpret the record, the fundamental issue is whether [the professor] 
had a contractual right to be evaluated and kept informed of his progress 
toward tenure. The answer to that question requires resort to the actual 
employment contract, those documents expressly incorporated into it (the 
Faculty Manual, the Bylaws of the American Association of Law Schools, and 
the “Standards and Rules of Procedures,” Approval of Law Schools, American 
Bar Association) and the customs and practices of the University.407 
Not all cases that utilize the customs and practices of an institution as a 
contractual interpretation device hold for the faculty member. In Brown v. 
George Washington University,408 an education professor challenged her denial 
of promotion and tenure as a breach of contract. She claimed that her 
department had not followed its own written policy that provided that 
candidates for promotion would be invited to appear before the promotion 
committee to present additional relevant information. Faculty members in the 
education department testified that they had a practice of interpreting this 
provision as discretionary.409 In deciding for the university, the court ruled that 
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the department’s interpretation was reasonable and not a breach of contract.410 
The custom and usage of this particular department, therefore, determined the 
outcome of the case. 
Other courts have recognized custom and usage of the academic 
community—not just at a specific university or department but the scholarly 
community as a whole—to analyze the terms of a professor’s contract. William 
A. Kaplin and Barbara A. Lee observe in this regard: 
As a method of contractual interpretation, a court may look beyond the policies 
of the institution to the manner in which faculty employment terms are shaped 
in higher education generally. In these cases the court may use “academic 
custom and usage” to determine what the parties would have agreed to had 
they addressed a particular issue. This interpretive device is only used, 
however, when the contract is ambiguous, or when a court believes that a 
significant element of the contract is missing.411 
For example, in McConnell v. Howard University, a professor was fired 
because he refused to teach a math class until a disciplinary dispute with a 
student was resolved.412 He challenged his termination on breach of contract 
grounds.413 In remanding the case for trial, the court noted that when the 
contract terms are ambiguous, they “must be construed in keeping with general 
usage and custom at the University and within the academic community.”414 
Also, in Board of Regents of Kentucky State University v. Gale, a professor 
was appointed to the institution’s first endowed chair in the humanities.415 The 
university subsequently sought to make the professor execute a contract that 
would impose a time limitation on his endowed chair.416 The professor 
challenged the university’s actions in court arguing that his appointment 
implicitly came with permanent status (i.e., tenure).417 The court, in ruling for 
the professor, noted, “The evidence relied upon by the trial court in the instant 
case showed that, unless the advertisement for the position otherwise indicated, 
it was customary and understood within the academic community that the chair 
was to be occupied by a distinguished colleague for his life time.”418 The 
academic custom and usage of the professoriate was, thus, determinative in 
analyzing this implied term. 
Although this remains an issue yet to be decided by the courts, when 
academic freedom is not addressed in a professor’s employment contract, I 
 
 410. Id. at 387. 
 411. KAPLIN & LEE, supra note 251, at 479–80. 
 412. McConnell v. Howard Univ., 818 F.2d 58, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 413. Id. at 62. 
 414. Id. at 64 (emphasis added). 
 415. Bd. of Regents of Ky. State Univ. v. Gale, 898 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995). 
 416. Id. at 520. 
 417. Id. 
 418. Id. at 521. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
524 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:461 
argue that the custom and usage of the academic community regarding these 
rights can be elucidated by AAUP policies and principles. Matthew W. Finkin 
and Robert C. Post contend: 
As the reasoned conclusions of an especially knowledgeable body, the 
opinions of Committee A [AAUP’s investigative committee] offer an 
unusually rich resource for understanding the meaning of academic freedom in 
America. They strive to interpret a governing instrument, the 1940 Statement, 
which has achieved near-universal acceptance in the academic community. 
They do so in a disciplined, lawlike way, seeking to apply principle to context, 
often by reasoning from precedential analogies. . . . They are backed by a 
system of sanctions that, although lacking the coercive power of the state, are 
nevertheless consequential. The opinions thus conduce toward a coherent 
national system of norms.419 
This coherent set of norms can aid courts in interpreting the reasonable 
expectations of professors and universities when they enter into contractual 
relationships. Specifically, I can envision a dispute in which a professor claims 
that her university violated her contractually based academic freedom rights 
and the university responds that these rights do not exist because they are not 
explicitly provided for in the employment agreement. Along with other sources 
of implicit terms, if any, a court can benefit by turning to AAUP opinions and 
policies as general academic custom and usage to determine the reasonable 
expectation of the parties regarding academic freedom in this situation. 
3. The Limitations of Contract Law and Suggested Solutions 
Due to the limitations of constitutionally based academic freedom, contract 
law is better at protecting individual faculty members when their interests 
diverge from their institutions. However, contract law is by no means perfect. 
In this section, I highlight three limitations of a contracts-based approach to 
academic freedom and offer potential solutions. 
First, contracts are governed by state law, so the law of one state may 
conflict with the laws in others.420 For example, even though I highlighted 
some key legal decisions that rely on an expansive view of what constitutes a 
professor’s employment contract, some courts are reluctant to take this 
interpretive path. I have already discussed three New York cases that have 
rejected professors’ contract-based claims against their universities, holding 
that the proper legal mechanism for challenging their employment grievances 
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was Article 78.421 Other courts have also rejected contract claims brought by 
professors. In Marson v. Northwestern State University, an associate professor 
challenged his termination as in violation of the university’s faculty 
handbook.422 The state appellate court held that the faculty handbook was not 
binding because it was not explicitly made part of the employment 
agreement.423 Similarly, in University of Baltimore v. Iz, the appellate court 
found that general statements of policy contained in the faculty handbook did 
not create enforceable contract rights.424 In a case dealing with academic 
custom and usage, Jones v. University of Central Oklahoma, a professor of 
education challenged his denial of tenure, arguing that it violated the custom 
and usage of the university regarding prior tenure decisions.425 In holding for 
the university, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that custom and usage will 
not supersede a contrary written tenure policy, even if past practice by the 
university differs from the written terms.426 Also, contrary to some of the cases 
I analyzed that demonstrated a broad view of using AAUP policy statements to 
resolve a number of educational disputes, some courts have ruled that an 
adoption of a particular statement will not contractually bind the university to 
subsequently issued statements. For example, in Waring v. Fordham 
University, a faculty member at the Graduate School of Social Service who 
was denied tenure sued for breach of contract.427 Fordham University had a 
policy that placed a limit on the proportion of tenured faculty at each of its 
schools.428 Fordham, however, had adopted the 1940 Statement that did not 
issue an opinion on tenure quotas—not the subsequent 1973 Statement 
opposing such quotas.429 The court, noting that the university did not adopt the 
1973 Statement, ruled that the university’s action was not a breach of 
contract.430 Because of the vagaries of differing state laws, Cary Nelson urges 
that “shared governance, due process, and tenure regulations need to be 
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mirrored in legally enforceable contracts.”431 Clarity in express contractual 
language is essential. Clear contract language that creates such terms will, thus, 
provide professors and universities with much more predictability in how a 
court will enforce the rights of the parties. Jim Jackson advocates an even 
stronger approach to contract drafting by arguing that the language should “not 
only describe academic freedom as contractual but[,] in an interpretive sense[,] 
say that it is a fundamental clause.”432 This would benefit both professors and 
universities by ensuring that the unique context of American higher education 
is taken into account when enforcing the contractual rights and duties of the 
parties. 
Second, the greater bargaining power that universities have over professors 
may skew the agreement terms away from academic freedom. Some scholars 
have suggested that universities may even try to tweak contract language to 
weaken such protection and offer jobs to professors on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.433 Others have warned of the dangers when employers unilaterally 
change their policies.434 In these situations, professors can claim protection 
under the doctrine of unconscionability. This doctrine reflects the idea “that a 
court may refuse to enforce a contract that is unfair or oppressive because of 
procedural abuses during contract formation or because of overreaching 
contractual terms, esp. terms that are unreasonably favorable to one party while 
precluding meaningful choice for the other party.”435 However, the heavy 
burden in proving unconscionability would lie with the professor. Another 
possible solution would be for professors to rely on the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in contract law. This is an “implied covenant to 
refrain from any act that would injure a contracting party’s right to receive the 
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benefit of the contract.”436 This covenant is premised on the idea that certain 
promises are “instinct with an obligation” to act in good faith.437 An aggrieved 
faculty member that had academic freedom rights written out of her contract 
could claim that the university breached its duty to act in good faith. These 
protective doctrines, however, are open to the criticism that they create 
uncertainty in outcomes due to the subjective judicial evaluations they require. 
Therefore, the better solution would entail professors negotiating for clear 
terms in their contracts. In order to improve their bargaining positions, I argue 
that professors should enter into or strengthen their relationships with 
educational organizations that can create pressure for universities to operate in 
good faith in making academic freedom part of their employment agreements. 
The AAUP is one of their strongest allies in this regard. For example, this 
organization recently advocated for model policy language regarding academic 
freedom rights being adopted by universities across the country. In a report in 
2009, the AAUP pointed to the following clause from the University of 
Minnesota’s academic freedom policy as particularly effective language for 
incorporation in faculty handbooks and agreements: 
Academic freedom is the freedom to discuss all relevant matters in the 
classroom, to explore all avenues of scholarship, research, and creative 
expression, and to speak or write without institutional discipline or restraint on 
matters of public concern as well as on matters related to professional duties 
and the functioning of the University. Academic responsibility implies the 
faithful performance of professional duties and obligations, the recognition of 
the demands of the scholarly enterprise, and the candor to make it clear when 
one is speaking on matters of public interest, one is not speaking for the 
institution.438 
Incorporation of such policy language into professors’ contracts can 
provide a shared contractual basis of academic freedom rights across the 
country. In addition, the AAUP has been working to create pressure on 
universities through the accreditation process. In a 2012 statement, the AAUP, 
in conjunction with the Council for Higher Education Accreditation, argued 
that accreditation agencies take academic freedom into account when making 
their decisions.439 The statement offered the following suggestions for 
accrediting agencies: 
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 Emphasize the principle of academic freedom in the context of accreditation 
review, stressing its fundamental meaning and essential value. 
 Affirm the role that accreditation plays in the protection and advancement 
of academic freedom. 
 Review current accreditation standards, policies and procedures with regard 
to academic freedom and assure that institutions and programs accord with 
high expectations in this vital area. 
 At accreditation meetings and workshops, focus on challenges to academic 
freedom, with particular attention to the current climate and its effect on 
faculty, institutions and programs. 
 Explore developing partnerships among accreditors to concentrate 
additional attention on academic freedom and further secure the 
commitment of the entire accreditation community.440 
By making academic freedom a consideration for accreditation, professors’ 
bargaining position with regard to this term would be greatly enhanced. 
Specifically, universities would be more likely to adopt contractual obligations 
regarding academic freedom if accreditation agencies were evaluating them 
based on their commitment to this freedom. 
Third, academic freedom, as defined by contract law, may support the 
erroneous view that higher education can be reduced to a commodity—i.e., 
universities are simply pushing a commercial product on students, who are just 
consumers of this product. A number of scholars have critiqued this view.441 
Nonetheless, the commodity view of higher education continues to percolate 
through society. It was evidenced by a judge in a case involving a student who 
challenged the university’s disciplinary action for his sexual misconduct. The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held for Brandeis, but a dissenting 
judge in the case disagreed with the majority, observing, “As consumers, 
students should not be subject to disciplinary procedures that fail to comport 
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with the rules promulgated by the school itself.”442 In a footnote that 
accompanied the word “consumers,” the court noted, “As college costs have 
been rapidly increasing, students and their parents often must make a 
substantial financial investment to obtain an education.”443 The dissenting 
judge, thus, argued that any ambiguity in the disciplinary rules should have 
been read in the student’s favor because of his status as a “consumer” who 
pays for his educational product.444 Although this was a dissenting opinion in a 
non-academic freedom case, the view that students are mere consumers of 
higher education is problematic because it downplays or ignores the public 
good that higher education produces and reduces higher education to a 
consumer good. However, this purported limitation is not fatal to contractually 
based academic freedom. Just because an agreement is reduced to a written 
contract does not mean that its terms have to involve only market-based values. 
For example, the previously discussed use of collective bargaining agreements 
to memorialize academic freedom principles is an apt illustration. While the 
AAUP was initially reluctant to pursue unionization for fear of diminishing its 
image as a defender of non-economic goals, it later realized that it could 
capture the higher purposes of university work by incorporating these ideals 
directly into the collective bargaining agreements themselves.445 In addition, 
international treaties provide further insight. These treaties can be viewed as 
contracts between nations.446 Some of these treaties, such as the United 
Nations International Bill of Human Rights or the Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, involve agreements that 
reflect values, such as human dignity and preservation of the environment. The 
fact that these agreements are reduced to writing in no way diminishes the non-
market aspects of these values. Similarly, professors’ employment contracts 
can reflect the social usefulness of higher education as articulated by AAUP 
policy statements and acknowledged by courts without embracing a 
commodity view of the American university. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article was motivated, in part, by my interest in the ways that higher 
education, at its best, transforms the perspectives of its students by allowing an 
environment of free inquiry, vigorous debate, and unhindered exploration of 
various perspectives. This transformative power is situated in the freedom that 
higher educational actors—both professors and universities—have over their 
educationally based decisions. Academic freedom at American universities, 
however, is, by no means, guaranteed. Generations of professors have fought 
for it, and the fight continues to this day. 
Although constitutionally based academic freedom can provide some 
safeguards to educational actors from excessive state interference, it is 
insufficient to protect the multitude of interests that arise in contemporary 
disputes. Due to the restrictions of the state action doctrine, constitutional 
academic freedom does not apply to private universities, leaving professors at 
these institutions without First Amendment protection. And even in public 
institutions where the Constitution is applicable, judicial decision makers have 
recently put academic freedom at risk by either significantly narrowing the 
protections of professorial free speech or denying the very existence of 
professorial academic freedom. Further, broad constitutional remedies may be 
poorly suited to address the almost infinite variation of university contexts 
across the country. 
There is, however, another way. Specifically, developing a body of 
contractually based academic freedom case law would greatly expand the ways 
that courts can protect aggrieved professors when their interests diverge from 
their employers’. Unlike First Amendment principles, contract law would 
protect professors at both public and private universities. It would also allow 
for the proper consideration of the custom and usage of the academic 
community as either express or implied contract terms in resolving disputes 
between universities and professors. Finally, contract law would enable courts 
to structure remedies that take into account the particular campus contexts that 
give rise to various disputes instead of crafting broad remedies that may ill fit 
certain campus environments. 
 
